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The topic of this master thesis is leverage in international mediation and it focuses on the empirical 
study of the faith-based mediation by the Catholic Lay NGO called the Community of Sant’Egidio. 
The religious aspects shaping their mediation approach are studied through three empirical case 
studies in the context of peace processes in Mozambique, Liberia, and Casamance in Senegal to 
find out the particular resources they can draw on when conducting mediation, and the challenges 
that follow from their mediation approach. 
In the traditional view of theory on leverage The Community of Sant’Egidio is not viewed as 
leveraged mediator capable of influencing the mediation process. Nevertheless the theory of 
capability and credibility leverage as well as theory on faith-based mediation shows that there are 
more ways of being an influential and capable mediator than just material power. 
The religious aspects are a source of motivation for Sant’Egidio to conduct mediation. Through 
their religious identity they can also get unique moral and spiritual leverage and to connect with 
people through their Communities worldwide helping them to get involved indirectly to peace 
processes establishing personal relationships with local religious, and political actors as well as civil 
society. Furthermore other particular resources, which they can draw on when conducting mediation 
are their reputation as credible, legitimate, and honest broker as well as their financial support and 
donations, which enable them to stay engaged in mediation. Their identity as a neutral and 
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The focus of the master thesis is on empirical study of the resources and leverage of faith-based 
mediation. Above all I concentrate on studying the Catholic Lay NGO, the Community of 
Sant’Egidio. It was a long journey to come to this topic. When I first came interested in 
international mediation I was inspired by the work of the former President of Finland, Martti 
Ahtisaari. I pursued to know more about the sphere of mediation so I wrote my bachelor thesis 
comparing EU and UN mediation behavior. All together I noticed to be writing a lot about leverage 
since it is very central concept in the theory of mediation. When I started to think about the topic for 
my master thesis I thought I could use the opportunity to take a step forward and look into the 
theoretical concept of leverage more deeply. The idea of leverage explains the power and influence 
of mediation. I wanted to look into NGOs working with mediation because they are from the 
traditional point of view not leveraged but can still influence the peace process with their own form 
of leverage. When I was looking for ideas for the master thesis and going through research I found 
out about the theory of Lindsey Reid who divides leverage into capability and credibility leverage. I 
am not particularly religious by any means but I chose to study the Community of Sant’Egidio 
because I found out a lot of research done concerning the mediation efforts by them. Furthermore 
the topic of faith-based mediation enabled me to narrow the focus of the research, and I thought it 
would be interesting to combine it with the theory of leverage. 
To justify the choice of the topic of my master thesis it is stated in the literature that resolving 
conflicts with peaceful means is cost effective. Compared to ending violence through military 
means fee for successful peace mediation and negotiations is much lower. It can be time consuming 
to get into sustainable peace but when it comes to faith-based mediation it is seen as their advantage 
that religious actors work with more leisurely pace and interact with the community also in other 
terms than the conflict. 
It is said that research on international peace mediation should develop better ways of 
understanding through describing and explaining mediation more accurately in the context of armed 
conflicts so that the mediation uses could be developed and refined. For example the term mediation 
has been often used as a general term in the literature describing different types of mediation. This 
is why I want to define all the concepts carefully and try to avoid vague concepts. 
The traditional view of leverage in mediation is that leverage is the power of mediation. Leverage is 




leverage dividing it into capability leverage and credibility leverage. In her view capability leverage 
represents the material resources and intangible resources are part of the credibility leverage, in 
which material power is not involved. 
Then again it is sometimes difficult to separate the effects of different kinds of mediation because in 
reality they can be applied in parallel as well as it can be difficult to explain what sources of faith-
based mediation actually did to transform the conflict towards peace. 
Religious organizations constitute an alternative to the official and governmental structures of a 
state. In this way faith-based mediation has the unique capability for social organization when the 
official structures are missing in the case of conflict. Faith-based mediators have significant cultural 
power because of their powerful and pervasive institutional presence. They also have high moral 
and spiritual legitimacy because they are embedded in the society.  
Legitimacy and leverage are crucial to successful mediation. To influence a conflict mediator needs 
leverage or resources. Intangible resources available to weak mediators as well include credibility, 
legitimacy, trust, moral standing and persuasive powers. Additionally faith-based mediators have 
unique moral and spiritual leverage. 
The Catholic Lay NGO, the Community of Sant’Egidio is presented as an example of faith-based 
mediation. Their mediation efforts are seen through the theoretical view of leverage in mediation to 
find out what are the sources of leverage for faith-based mediation. 
The problem statement is that while traditionally NGOs are not viewed as leveraged mediators, they 
are nevertheless able to influence peace processes, and through scrutinizing mediator leverage, a 
better understanding of the sources of leverage can be gained.  
The research object is the faith-based mediation by the Catholic Lay NGO, the Community of 
Sant’Egidio. 
The research questions are: How do the religious aspects of the Catholic Lay NGO Sant’Egidio 
shape their approach to mediation? What particular resources can they draw on when they 
conduct mediation, and what are the main challenges following from their approach? 
The content of the chapters is as follows. The chapter after the introduction presents the theoretical 
framework for leverage in faith-based mediation. Beginning with theories on peace and peace 
processes, mediation in general, and ending in mediator leverage and faith-based mediation. The 




divided to chapters four and five. The fourth chapter is connected to the first research question and 
thus concentrates on the data on the religious aspects shaping the mediation approach of 
Sant’Egidio. The fifth chapter is structured to present, discuss, and analyze the second research 
question thus the particular resources of Sant’Egidio when conducting mediation in the three cases 
of mediation as well as main challenges following from their approach to mediation. Finally the 
sixth chapter is the conclusion. 
The research tasks are to analyze the faith-based mediation of Sant’Egidio through document 
analysis and empirical case study method. Three cases are chosen where the Community of 
Sant’Egidio has been mediating. Those are Mozambique, Liberia, and Casamance region in 
Senegal. The three cases of mediation are studied as representing together the faith-based mediation 
by Sant’Egidio in different decades. 
The focus of the master thesis is on the resources and leverage of faith-based mediation by the 
Community of Sant’Egidio and so I would want to explore the concept of mediator leverage and to 
find out more about the potential of credibility leverage and sources of weak leverage that has been 
mostly ignored in the previous studies.  
Additionally I want to establish better understanding of the diversity of mediator leverage in the 
context of faith-based mediation by the Community of Sant’Egidio and the different sources of 
influence also other than material power. Moreover I would like to focus attention to the potential 
of a traditionally seemingly weak mediator as part of peace processes. 
1.1. Background on the Community of Sant’Egidio 
A high school student Andrea Riccardi initiated Sant’Egidio in 1968 gathering a group of other high 
school students in Rome. The founders of Sant’Egidio both the laymen and the priests are from 
wealthy families and are also highly educated sharing the same socio-cultural background. Their 
work started with teaching poor children in the outskirts of Rome. Originally they disagreed with 
the traditional order of the Catholic Church and so it is a lay community of Christians stemming 
from the Catholic Church nevertheless separate from it. The founding members are still the core of 
Sant’Egidio. (Anouilh 2011.106-107)  
In five years from its start the Community grew fast from a small group of people to hundred 
members. (Bartoli 2012. 109) The Community of Sant’Egidio is not originally an NGO but it is 
working like one when conducting mediation so that is why it is described as a Catholic Lay NGO 




Community of Sant’Egidio Association its first priority is evangelization and service to the poor 
(Riccardi 1996. 50). It is a non-profit organization that is an international actor structured as an 
international network of communities, which is recognized by the Holy See as an international 
public organization of lay people (Ibid. 49). Not an extension of the Holy See but distinct from the 
Vatican peacemaking. Despite frequent interaction with the Italian diplomats, Sant’Egidio has not 
concerted its actions with the government of Italy. (Riccardi 2010) The inner decision making 
structure of Sant’Egidio comes from its Statute as every four years a council and a president is 
elected even though suggestions and requests from the entire community are considered in making 
decisions (Riccardi 1996. 51-52). Furthermore Riccardi (Ibid. 59) notes that the community is based 
on mutual trust and freely accepted authority. 
As the connections of the Community of Sant’Egidio widened and more communities were 
established in different countries and continents they also got involved in distributing humanitarian 
aid first of all in Mozambique and through their humanitarian work in countries torn by conflict 
they got involved with work for peace and international mediation. Until 2001 Sant’Egidio had 
been involved in peaceful resolution of conflicts facilitating dialogue in Albania, Algeria, Burundi, 
Guatemala, Kosovo, and Mozambique leading to signed agreements (Bartoli 2001). More recent 
involvement in peace processes by Sant’Egidio has been in Togo, Casamance, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Sudan, Northern Uganda, Ivory Coast (Bartoli 2012. 109), and Liberia (Scelzo 
2010). Thus they started working with faith-based mediation from the beginning of 1990’s and have 





2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR LEVERAGE IN FAITH-
BASED MEDIATION 
The purpose of this master thesis is to find out how the religious aspects of the Catholic Lay NGO 
the Community of Sant’Egidio shape their approach to mediation as well as to look at the particular 
resources they have in their disposal to conduct mediation. Furthermore it describes the main 
challenges that follow from their unique approach to mediation. To fulfill this purpose and answer 
the research questions the theoretical framework presented in the theory chapter is used as a tool to 
analyze the qualitative research done through empirical studies of three selected cases. 
The second chapter of the master thesis is dedicated to theory that creates a framework for faith-
based mediation and leverage. It begins by explaining the basic understandings of peace and the 
characteristics of peace processes to form an understanding of the environment where mediation is 
exercised. Then moving forward to the theory of mediation in general and further to the concept of 
leverage in mediation, which is important as leverage is the essence of mediation that makes it able 
to shape the peace process or even resolve a conflict. In the end the faith-based mediator leverage is 
presented as the master thesis focuses on the mediation efforts by a faith-based mediator. 
2.1. Peace and peace processes 
One of the most prominent academics on peace, Johan Galtung (1964) coined the distinction 
between positive and negative peace that have been used widely and developed by many 
nonetheless for example by the leading scholars Jean-Paul Lederach (1996) and John Burton 
(1988). Positive peace is described as the absence of indirect and structural violence, and negative 
peace is the term for the absence of direct violence. (Silvestri and Mayall 2015. 9) 
Gleditsch et al. (2014) write about how the definition of peace in the field of peace research has 
evolved in the last 50 years. There are broader and narrower conceptions of peace and investigating 
through empirical patterns of their use Gleditsch et al. come to the conclusion that negative peace, 
which is the narrow concept of peace including the prevention and reduction of war and violence, 
has had the main focus from the beginning. Nevertheless, the concept of positive peace, which is 
additionally about the reversal of structural violence as well as cooperation and integration, has 
always been on the agenda as well. Positive peace was more used in peace research for 
approximately a decade ago. To some extent peace research has come back to analyzing the concept 
of negative peace while many scholars advocate for peace in a broad sense. Mac Ginty (2010. 159) 




human rights and democracy by the actors engaged in the peace processes and peace accords rather 
than the nature of peace would be seriously discussed. For this master thesis it is important to make 
the distinction of negative and positive peace since it is also connected to the mediation efforts. For 
example the mediation by Community of Sant’Egidio is more than just getting to an agreement but 
it is more deeply concerned with the parties and how they can also transform during the process of 
mediation thus thinking peace more broadly than just negative peace they try to influence the peace 
to become positive rather than just simply having the view that negative peace and end of conflict 
would be enough. 
There are different ways of defining the term peace process. Harold Saunders defines peace 
processes as political processes that are determined to resolve a conflict through peaceful means. 
According to Saunders peace processes are made out of politics, diplomacy, changing relationships, 
negotiation, mediation, and dialogue. All these peaceful efforts can happen in both official and non-
official arenas. (Burgess 2004) 
Saunders describes four simultaneous arenas, in which peace processes operate that are, official 
arena, quasi-official arena, public peace process, and civil society. The official arena is referred to 
as well as the track 1 where diplomats officially establish personal relationships with their 
counterparts. They are in charge of negotiating interim and final agreements as well as improving 
the relationships between the governments of the countries in conflict. Susan Allen Nan describes 
the quasi-official arena as the track 1.5., which is about the cooperation of the track 1 and track 2. 
The track 1.5 involves people who have close ties to the governments of the countries that are in 
conflict, and so a mediator is trading information back and forth the governments. The third arena 
of a peace process is public peace process, in which non-official dialogue is practiced addressing 
the humane aspects of the causes of conflict, such as perceptions, stereotypes and distrust. Public 
peace process is the opposite of the official governmental arena. The fourth arena in which the 
peace process simultaneously operates is the civil society, which is a bundle of networks of 
relationships between groups of people. In a conflict these relationships break down which leads to 
disputes between the groups thus causing tears in the framework of the civil society and in a peace 
process these relationships have to be rebuilt. Tim Sisk provides a definition of peace processes that 
are reciprocal steps of confidence building and resolving issues related to the conflict as well as 
designing a peaceful future with the assistance of a third-party mediator. (Burgess 2004) 
Previously the different tracks of diplomacy were only seen as presented by Burgess (2004) but the 




tracks by Dr. Louise Diamond and Ambassador John McDonald who created the Institute for Multi-
Track Diplomacy (IMTD). IMTD promotes the holistic and comprehensive approach to conflict 
transformation that is more likely to lead to long-term, sustainable peace. Multi-track diplomacy is a 
concept that presents the process of peacebuilding as a living system, in which everything and 
everyone is interconnected and ideally operate together for the common goal of peace on earth. All 
the tracks are as important with their own values, resources, and approaches. The tracks from two to 
nine are supporting the Track 1 through preparing an environment that allows positive change also 
ensuring that the official decisions are actualized and implemented properly in the society. To 
mention the track that is under scrutiny in this master thesis, it is Track 7, which includes 
peacemaking through faith such as the beliefs and peace oriented actions of religious communities. 
IMTD suggest that well-coordinated cooperation of the different actors enables them to be more 
leveraged as a whole. (IMTD 2016) In this vein multi-track diplomacy also shows that religious and 
secular actors do not have to work against each other but can cooperate for peace. Notwithstanding 
the added value of non-official mediators and different tracks of diplomacy, the involvement of 
multiple actors in the peace processes can have also its down sides (Garrigues 2015. 6). Additional 
efforts along the official peace process can be uncoordinated, send mix messages and undermine the 
broader strategy how to reach peace or reduce violence (Ibid.). 
Today’s peace processes are more complex and comprehensive than the traditional peace processes, 
which followed a regular pattern from ceasefire to political agreement and then Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). International community has consumed huge amounts of 
money, policy attention as well as moral energy in pursuit of peace. Peacebuilding efforts extend 
beyond security and disarmament encompassing state building through reforming institutions and 
for example social inclusion. (Garrigues 2015) Mac Ginty (2010. 146) argues that in the 
contemporary world conditions for peacebuilding after a civil war are especially propitious because 
of the amount of resources mobilized for peacebuilding. 
Graham Spencer (2016) writes in his article about leading a peace process. The informal and formal 
actions in negotiating a peace agreement complement each other. On one hand the pragmatism and 
consensus-building as well the power of talk and informal are considered as the key. In a peace 
process the conditionality and the context as well as recognizing implicitly the powerful role of 
emotions is vital. On the other hand the role of text and formal documentation are also important. 
With the formal structures the leadership of the peace process is exercised through a set of steps and 
processes. Without the informal efforts to build trust the formal efforts to achieve an agreement 




personal engagement and the informal socialization can be additional drivers of the peace process. 
(Spencer 2016) 
Ceasefires remain a critical part of the peace process and nowadays it can occur before, during or 
after political negotiations. The difficulty to monitor ceasefires is problematic for the mediators and 
they can become more of a commentator than a referee in the peace process. (Garrigues, 2015, 4) 
Nevertheless Galama and van Tongeren (2002) argue in the article of Mac Ginty (2010. 146) that 
the intervening agents such as states and organizations on different levels can perform more 
sophisticatedly since they have developed best practices and lessons learned from their previous 
experiences. 
Even though it is called a peace process it does not necessarily lead to resolution of a conflict or to 
peace. Mac Ginty (2010. 145) argues that it is because of structural factors behind the concept of 
liberal peace. The structural factors he states are the inflexibility and ethnocentricity that liberal 
peace often entails, and thus it is unable to address the underlying factors that caused the armed 
conflict. In this way he argues that the regular result of these peace support operations are stalled 
and dysfunctional peace that is characterized by poverty and insecurity, maintained violent conflict 
and failure to deal with the causes of the conflict. (Mac Ginty 2010) 
Peace processes can lead to a situation of “no war, no peace” that often are characterized by 
persistent low level violence. An example of this can occur in the case of a stalled peace process, 
which becomes a hollow comfort zone more comfortable than war that removes the urgency of 
pushing for a settlement. The cessation of hostilities and the commencement of peacebuilding 
efforts can already include many positive changes but problems as well. Mac Ginty referring to 
Collier (2004) notes that the first problem is the fragility of peace right after the civil war. The risk 
of resuming the civil war is high. Second he mentions the questionable quality of the peace that can 
be seen, when the return of the economic, political and moral investments are poor. The third 
fundamental problem is the regularity of the “no war, no peace” situations after the civil war end. 
(Mac Ginty 2010) These are some issues that the mediator should be able to overcome, and to be 
able to generate sustainable peace instead of short term solutions. 
2.2. General mediation 
Mediator’s job is to assist two or more parties in conflict to develop a mutually acceptable 
agreement (Garrigues 2015). When the communication and negotiations between the conflicting 




of an outside party. Mediation reflects different conflicts, parties, and situations thus it is 
characterized by being an adaptive and responsive procedure (Bercovitch, Jackson and Wells 2009. 
34). Mediation is one of the most important ways of solving contemporary international conflicts, 
and it can be the most effective technique when it comes to dealing with the challenging conflicts of 
the 21st century with peaceful means. One noteworthy structural factor affecting mediation is timing 
that affects the chances of successful mediation. Third-party mediation is likely to take place in the 
conflicts that are protracted and complex, and when the conflicting parties have reached a stalemate 
and they want to avoid further costs and escalation of the conflict. In other words there is a ripe 
moment when the parties are ready to cooperate. (Bercovitch, Jackson and Wells 2009. 32) 
Consequences of successful mediation can be detected in the fairness of the mediation, the 
satisfaction of the parties, and the overall improvement of the climate nevertheless it is a subjective 
opinion that is not so easy to measure. (Bercovitch, Jackson and Wells 2009) Spangler (2003) 
presents two approaches to mediation that are problem-solving mediation and transformative 
mediation that reach for different outcomes and definitions of successful mediation’s goals or 
desired change. Problem-solving mediation drives for mutually acceptable solution actively guiding 
the process and getting a short-term solution to the conflict. Problem-solving mediation can be 
compared to the directive strategies of mediation that push towards the peace agreement but do not 
acknowledge the own strengths of the parties to find their solution. Robert A. Baruch Bush and 
Joseph Folger (Spangler 2003) have outlined a framework for the practice of transformative 
mediation. The keys to transformative mediation are empowerment and recognition concepts that 
affect beyond the conflict showing in the everyday lives of the people in the conflict environment. 
Empowerment in transformative mediation means strengthening the conflicting parties’ own 
capacity to solve the conflict by making them more aware of their goals, resources, options, and 
preferences. When the conflicting parties have clarity of their capabilities and acknowledge and 
give value to their skills they are able to make better decisions on how to solve the conflict. 
Recognition in transformative mediation means that the perspective, views, and experiences of the 
opposite party in the conflict. This kind of recognition ideally evokes understanding and empathy to 
the situation and problems that the other side is dealing with so that the conflicting parties would be 
able to be more considerate towards each other and that this process of acknowledgement of one's 
adversary as a human being with their own legitimate concerns would lead to reconciliation. 
(Spangler 2003) Supporting transformative mediation Egeland (2012. 54) argues that conflicting 
parties pursue less than logical short-term goals thus they do not behave rationally. Moreover Atran 




symbolic sincere gestures such as apology instead of money can provide a more positive impact to 
the mediation process. 
Most commonly in the literature the different kinds of strategies of mediation are called directive or 
manipulative, formulative, and facilitative strategies that present a typology of mediation strategies 
by Zartman and Touval (1985). From the perspective of leverage that has been described in the 
most extant literature as material power, the strategies are presented in this order from the directive 
strategies having the most leverage to the facilitative strategies having the least leverage. Zartman 
and Touval (1985. 27) describe the roles of a mediator as communicator, formulator, or 
manipulator. A communicator helps to create a line of communication between the parties in 
conflict when direct interaction between the parties is impossible. A formulator is a more active 
role, in which the mediator creates innovative solutions to the conflict. Actually Zartman and 
Touval (1985) themselves do not use the term formulative strategy but for them carrying messages 
and proposing ideas together are facilitative strategies. Mediator as a manipulator has the most 
active role manipulating the parties to move into the most stable and favorable agreement. In this 
structural role that includes power and relations the mediator changes the conflict from dyadic to a 
triangular structure using their positions and resources. (Zartman and Touval 1985) Similarly 
Bercovitch and Gartner (2006. 338-339) offer a thorough explanation of the strategies of mediation 
in their article. 
Traditionally facilitative and formulative mediation strategies, such as facilitating peace talks and 
formulating solutions and mutually acceptable agreements to the parties in conflict, are viewed as 
strategies where the mediator doesn’t have much leverage over the disputants. They are weak 
because of the lack of material resources available to them. This is also called as pure mediation, 
where the mediator can only use her power of persuasion to change people’s minds. The view of a 
mediator as a credible mediator comes from the commitment they show towards the peace process. 
Mediators with lack of material power are also seen as neutral mediators, such as individuals, 
NGOs, regional organizations. (Zartman and Touval 1985) 
On the other side there are the attributes connected to strong mediators such as states that are large 
powers, which can use directive strategies and also threaten with military power, in other words 
also called as mediation with muscle (Wallensteen and Svensson 2014). In such way they have the 
capability to manipulate the bargaining process with sticks and carrots. 
Bercovitch, Jackson and Wells (2009. 44) suggest that mediation behavior thus the strategies of 




the outcome to be successful. Mediators do not choose their strategies randomly but they vary their 
behavior reflecting the particular circumstances of the conflict consequently mediation is contingent 
and reciprocal. Evaluating the outcomes of mediation in connection with the efforts of the mediator 
is done often but reluctantly by the mediators’ own informal reflections. (Bercovitch, Jackson and 
Wells 2009) 
Beardsley (2009) notes that in the 63 percent of mediation events a mediator without material 
leverage has been mediating. Nevertheless a mediator without material leverage can be an effective 
and relevant mediator. Consequently facilitative mediation strategies, thus the mediation strategies 
used by faith-based actors, reduce post-crisis tensions and commitment problems because those are 
more likely to lead to mutually preferable agreements. Then again it is sometimes difficult to 
separate the effects of different kinds of mediation and it can be difficult to explain what faith-based 
mediation actually did to transform the conflict towards peace. 
In the article of Wallensteen and Svensson (2014) it is noted that DeRouen and Bercovitch (2012) 
find that the most frequent type of strategy in mediating civil wars has been formulative mediation. 
The second most used strategy is facilitative mediation and the least used is manipulative 
mediation. The studies of Wilkenfeld et al. (2005) and Beardsley et al. (2006) came to the 
conclusion that facilitative mediation strategies reduce post-crisis tensions and commitment 
problems because those are more likely to lead to mutually preferable agreements. Super power 
mediation that is used because of the ability of the large states to conduct manipulative strategies 
according to Gurses, Rost and McLeod (2008) leads to increased probability of renewed fighting. 
Then again it is sometimes difficult to separate the effects of different kinds of mediation because in 
reality they can be applied in parallel. Beardsley (2008) argues that, when assessing in the long 
term, powerful and hard strategies might be ultimately counterproductive, and the most durable 
agreements would be achieved with the least amount of external involvement. (Wallensteen and 
Svensson 2014. 319-320) 
2.3. NGO mediation 
Naturally NGOs who are involved in mediation rely on facilitative and formulative strategies of 
mediation. Nevertheless they can work together with more traditionally powerful mediators. 
NGOs working in different fields such as religious or humanitarian organizations involved with 




non-official mediators can be for example individuals who act depending on their status as insider 
mediators or other leveraged individuals outside of the conflict area. (Garrigues 2015. 1) 
According to Garrigues, in the early stages of conflict non-official mediators like NGOs can be the 
most useful ones to begin dialogues and test the commitment of the armed groups. When the parties 
are opposing the official mediation the non-official mediators can pave the way for the future 
mediation efforts. In that way the non-official mediators’ perceived weakness is in fact their 
strength. In intractable conflicts the non-official mediators can act as interlocutors maintaining the 
contacts to the conflicting parties. Due to political reasons official mediators are not as free to 
engage for example with a certain splinter group or commander of an armed group. In such case the 
non-official actors can take over those parts of the peace process and can help to negotiate smaller 
ceasefires locally. Greater engagement with armed groups through the non-official actors supports 
the move forward in peace processes (Ibid. 6). (Garrigues 2015. 5)  
Non-official mediators can be more agile than official mediators. According to Antonia Potter 
Prentice (Powell, 2014), the smaller and less formal institutions that are backing the mediation 
efforts, especially in the beginning of the peace process, have more room to maneuver because of 
the shorter chain of command and not having a strict mandate. (Garrigues 2015. 6) 
So called NGO mediators can be from very diverse backgrounds. Mediators can be differentiated 
according to their position in the peace process, such as can they be described as international or 
local, insider or outsider, having close ties with government or completely independent. Lanz et al. 
also present various functions that can be placed under the definition of NGO mediation. 
International NGOs can facilitate negotiations of official Track 1 level with the conflicting parties. 
NGO mediators can also provide supportive activities such as expertise, and capacity-building for 
the official mediators on Track 1 level. As Track 1.5 NGO mediators can facilitate informal 
processes before, after, or in parallel to Track 1 negotiations. Strengthening peace constituencies 
locally is preferred to as Track 2 mediation. On Track 3 level NGO mediators engage grassroots to 
build support for the peace process more broadly. (Lanz et al. 2009, 3-4) 
Early engagement is said to prevent further escalation of violence. Local NGOs are suggested to be 
the most suitable on this stage because of their local networks and insider information. Even though 
NGOs are present more or less in all stages of peace processes, they are often the ones to catch the 
signals of conflict escalation first. In general NGOs are able to respond to the changing situation on 
the ground quickly because of their less complicated decision-making procedures. Even though 




reluctant to engage, and so NGOs can take part more freely in communication for example with so 
called terrorists. (Ibid. 5) 
Lanz et al. (2009. 6) argue that in asymmetric conflicts NGO mediators have an advantage in 
gaining the trust of armed non-state groups, and on the other hand they may seem less threatening to 
the stronger party in conflict thus being able to persuade the parties to take part in the peace 
negotiations. NGO mediators can offer topical, regional, and process expertise in the complex 
processes of peace negotiations. Because NGO mediators generally do not pursue geopolitical goals 
and do not use coercive methods they are perceived as trustworthy by the parties in conflict. NGO 
mediators are value-based and they are able to foster a perception of mediation that is more than 
just getting into peace agreement. Especially the locally rooted NGOs can foster a genuine culture 
for peace already from the mediation process onwards, and promote peaceful values in the society.  
(Ibid. 7) 
2.4. Framework for mediator leverage 
Traditionally the theory on leverage in mediation is closely connected to the styles and strategies 
available to the mediators. The traditional view of leverage in mediation is that leverage is the 
power of mediation. Leverage is closely related to the manipulative strategy. Reid (2015) suggests a 
more elaborated definition of leverage dividing it into capability leverage and credibility leverage. 
In her view capability leverage represents the manipulative strategies, and formulative and 
facilitative strategies are part of the credibility leverage, in which material power is not involved. 
This is not an exhaustive account of the different theories but the views about mediator leverage of 
the most influential researchers of the field have been considered.  
The traditional view on leverage is based on Zartman and Touval (1985) that present an interest-
based approach to mediator leverage and they explain leverage as a multidimensional concept. In 
their view leverage is about adding arguments and inducements that are able to change an 
unattractive proposal to appear attractive. This kind of manipulative strategy of mediation, in which 
these directive measures are used, is the opposite of naturally leading parties to agreement through 
facilitative and formulative strategies with providing communications and attractive ideas to the 
parties. According to Zartman and Touval (1985. 40) leverage comes first and most importantly 
from the conflicting parties’ need for a solution that the mediator is able to provide to them, 
secondly the susceptibility of the conflicting parties to shifting weight that the mediator is able to 
apply, and thirdly they view that mediator leverage comes from the conflicting parties’ interest in 




leverage is completely excluded from the facilitative and formulative styles of mediation in this 
view. The theory of leverage by Zartman and Touval (1985) helps to understand the limitations of it 
but not how to increase leverage in mediation processes. Zartman (2009) mentions that much of the 
work on mediation either exaggerates or underestimates the nature of leverage (Zartman 2009. 1) 
In another article by Zartman (2008) leverage is similarly said to be the term for power in 
mediation. Nevertheless Zartman describes it as a scarce resource, which is more about effective 
persuasion rather than material inducements and punishments depending first of all on the need of 
the conflicting parties for an agreement. (Zartman 2008. 305) Bercovitch and Houston (2000. 179) 
comprise the nature of a mediator from their identity, resources, and relationships thus forming their 
position in the mediation process. The nature of the mediator determines the ability to use different 
types of power, resources, and leverage. (Bercovitch and Houston 2000. 179) 
The article of Beardsley (2009) on weak mediator leverage shows the dominant view of the 
academia, in which leverage is seen as advantages related to power and economic resources as well 
as information as a source of leverage from superior intelligence capabilities. A mediator without 
access to sources of leverage is called a weak mediator. Reid (2015) argues that one of the 
weaknesses of the traditional view of leverage is that mediator types are conflated with leverage 
such as can be seen here when only strong mediators such as states with large powers are argued to 
have leverage. Producing a peace agreement also a weak mediator can be effective therefore a weak 
mediator can be just seemingly weak, which shows the weakness described by Reid (2015) when 
leverage is equated with material power rather than elaborated.  
So called weak mediators, such as NGOs and individuals or regional organizations, are more 
limited with their choice of mediation strategies than mediators with greater capacity and resources 
such as big states and the UN. Weak mediators are more likely to mediate in the periphery of the 
international system. They are also more likely mediate when there are democratic neighbors 
around the conflict area. Additionally combatants with insincere motives such as trying to stall the 
peace process for a better deal engage themselves more likely with weak mediators. (Beardsley 
2009) 
Wilkenfeld et al. (2003) find that all mediation strategies are not equal in their capabilities of 
enhancing crisis management. The most effective strategy is manipulative mediation because it can 
achieve formal agreements at much higher rates than less intrusive strategies. Mediators using 
manipulative strategies are able to use their material leverage to alter incentive structures and to 




space for agreements consequently sometimes the agreements are forced. Werner and Yuen (2005) 
present the theory of unnatural agreement, which shows the problems of forcing peace agreements 
with directive strategies of mediation. Also Zartman and Touval (1985. 42) acknowledge that 
material leverage might lead to counterproductive reactions such as renewal of the fighting between 
the conflicting parties. 
Directive strategies are more commonly connected with biased mediators. This can be because the 
directive strategies are usually conducted by states, which have more material resources than NGOs 
for example and they have to protect their own interests as well. Svensson (2009. 448) argues that 
biased and neutral mediators have different capabilities to contribute to the outcome of the peace 
agreement through the dimensions of leverage and credibility. Svensson (2009) refers to the 
theories of Touval (1975) and Touval and Zartman (2001) when saying that biased mediators have 
more leverage and thus more influence over the conflicting parties by manipulating their 
relationship through regulating the material resources. Svensson (2009) argues that neutral 
mediators are engaged in mediation because of their interest to end the conflict and not to protect or 
manipulate the other party in conflict so that they would not be seen as credible to use material 
power. Svensson also notes that neutral mediators cannot implement security guarantees, or make 
agreements concerning power sharing or justice provisions thus he argues that the agreements made 
by neutral mediators are not the same quality as the ones mediated by biased mediators (Ibid. 446-
447). Svensson argues that special relationships can be created for example through supplying 
material support to the other party in conflict by the biased mediator (Ibid. 449). In the mediation in 
Mozambique by the Community of Sant’Egidio they were distributing humanitarian aid so it is a 
possibility that they were seen to certain extent as biased towards the other party in the conflict and 
got more leverage through this special relationship. This example also shows the connections of 
Sant’Egidio to other more materially leveraged actors in the peace process. Nevertheless this can be 
seen also as a historical tie. It may be that the nature of the previous ties is also noteworthy in a way 
that also cultural and historical ties can create a biased mediator. Furthermore Kydd (2003. 607-
608) argues that only biased mediator is credible for providing information to the parties in the 
mediation process and thus certain degree of bias is necessary in order to be a credible mediator. So 
in this way being biased is also connected to the facilitative and formulative strategies of mediation 
when the mediator is seen more credible messenger when biased towards the other party. 
However manipulative mediators often need to provide or arrange security guarantees between the 
parties to maximize the chance of achieving an agreement. When using manipulative strategies of 




parties pressure and sanctions are not always enough. In this case the less powerful mediation 
strategies, formulation and facilitation, can have significant and positive effects on formal 
agreement. Formulative strategies include suggesting and coordinating mutually acceptable 
solutions to overcome bargaining stalemates and shortsightedness, and to persuade the conflicting 
parties reconsidering zero-sum positions. Facilitative strategies are equally effective as formulative 
strategies of mediation. In protracted ethnic hostility for example, the mediator is sometimes just 
needed for forging basic communication channels and bridging information gaps as well as 
increasing the understanding and trust to one another. To some degree the strategies of mediation 
are cumulative and consequently it can be useful to have formulation and facilitation alongside the 
manipulative strategy in a peace process. (Quinn et al. 2013. 400-401) Quinn et al. (2013. 402) 
suggest that mediators can be short term crisis managers but not as effective to resolve conflicts in 
long term, and thus they see that permanent conflict termination might not be always a realistic goal 
for mediators neither the best use of mediators’ resources. 
Beardsley (2008) elaborates the term of leverage when talking about intangible and tangible 
resources. Resources are in this view seen as leverage. Having information about the conflict is an 
important asset for the mediator to use it as intangible leverage through facilitative and formulative 
strategies. Additionally intangible leverage can be drawn from promises of closer long term ties and 
prestige. (Ibid.) Furthermore Böhmelt (2009. 315) notes that previous ties between the possible 
future mediator and the parties in conflict can be beneficial thus mediator with indirect ties to the 
parties will be more leveraged than a traditionally powerful mediator without these connections. 
Thus third party mediation is more likely when there is a social network of indirect ties with outside 
parties involved in the conflict process increase the exchange of information with potential 
mediators and the conflicting parties (Böhmelt 2009. 298). 
An alternative to the traditional view of leverage is presented by Lindsay Reid (2015) who offers a 
more nuanced notion of mediator leverage and acknowledges that leverage varies from mediator to 
mediator. In her view, capability leverage is about material strength and coercion. Capability 
leverage enables the mediator in terms of funding the mediation process to maintain presence and to 
cover other costs related to mediation. (Ibid. 7). 
Then again credibility leverage is about the influence that a mediator can have from having 
information and contextual knowledge of the conflict as well as from the conflicting parties’ 




Reid connects credibility leverage to the mediators that has been traditionally seen as weak 
mediators. Referring to Princen (1992) Reid (2015. 4) argues that interests and information as 
intangible forms of leverage can shape the mediation process. Leverage is a characteristic of a 
mediator. She notes that there is thus diversity in the possibilities of influence or in other words 
leverage to shape mediation outcomes. (Ibid. 6) Reid also views leverage as context-dependent. 
(Ibid. 7) Because having information also bestows power it enables a mediator to shape the 
mediation process and is not only limited to communicating between the conflicting parties. 
Information on the specific context enables the mediator to encourage resolution of the underlying 
issues of the conflict. Reid argues that the historical ties and the past behavior of the mediator can 
show credible commitment of the mediator to the peace process. The conflicting parties can be 
more confident that the mediator will stay committed in the future. (Ibid. 8) Cultural ties are 
connected to the arguments about biased mediators thus the belligerents trust the mediator in a way 
that the mediator provides accurate information and genuine commitment to the peaceful 
settlement. (Ibid. 9) Furthermore different mediators bring their own forms of leverage to the 
mediation process (Ibid. 14). (Reid 2015) 
2.5. Faith-based mediator leverage 
Even though this master thesis concentrates on the Catholic Lay NGO and mediation from the 
Christian point of view is used as an example, it does not rule out that other religions have the same 
possibilities to use faith-based mediation. 
What might be called religion can be also seen as a variety of cultures, philosophies, and spiritual 
practices, which can be called as certain religions or not specified as such. Referring to Cavanaugh 
(2009) and Woodhead (2011) Silvestri and Mayall (2015) state that religion is not static but 
constantly configured differently. (Silvestri and Mayall 2015. 5) To be able to gain a deeper and 
sophisticated understanding of the power of religion it is needed to go further from the substantive 
approach to the functional one. In other words beyond the elements such as beliefs, doctrine and the 
institutions to analyze the articulation of faith in practice and considering the effects it has on the 
behavior, thoughts and choices of individuals and groups. (Ibid. 6) The five key characteristics of 
the essence of religion are refined by Glock and Stark (1965) in Silvestri and Mayall (2015). The set 
of relevant concepts from different perspectives of religion that make up religiosity are the ritual 
and the ideological components, the experiential and emotional side, intellectual engagement, and 
the consequential dimension or how embracing a religion affects other aspects of a person’s life. 




Silvestri and Mayall (2015) write that according to Danièle Hérvieu-Léger (2000), in the 
contemporary world, religion has become invisible and fragmented that is linked to understanding 
religion from the point of view of individual subjectivity and experience in the quotidian lives of 
people. Furthermore religion maintains a strong connection with tradition. Also the Community of 
Sant’Egidio notes this connection in the context of the Catholic Church that has a long history 
especially in Rome and how the Community of Sant’Egidio has its headquarters there. Religion is 
able to change its form in time but at the same time it continues to revive and reconnect with 
tradition thus staying vibrant and powerful in the present. This capability of religion is also reflected 
in the work of Sant’Egidio starting with helping the poor and humanitarian efforts then also using 
its status to mediate in peace processes. Clifford Geertz (1993. 90) describes the power of religion 
coming from a system of symbols that enables the establishment of powerful motivations through 
formulation of reasons for existence that look as if they are facts so that the motivations seem 
uniquely realistic. (Silvestri and Mayall 2015. 7-8) As mentioned above this is an important aspect 
also in the basis of motivation for the humanitarian and mediation work by the Community of 
Sant’Egidio. 
In line with Appleby who suggests that religiously based conflict resolution could be the most 
rapidly expanding sector of conflict analysis and conflict transformation in the international field 
(1998. 41) Grad (2014. 63) confirms that the role played by religion in connection with conflict 
resolution has been remarkably analyzed and explored in the past years. Silvestri and Mayall (2015. 
10) highlight the importance of the transformative and gradual dimension of processes leading 
towards peace involving stages of negative and positive peace when it comes to the contribution of 
religion to peace. 
Grad (2014) argues from empirical perspective that in every part of the peace process there can be 
religious actors and religious non-profit organizations involved to give legitimacy as well as 
spiritual and intercultural vision. (Ibid. 66-67) Grad (2014) analyzes the relationship between 
religion and the different stages of peace process from post-conflict peace building, peacemaking to 
peace-enforcement, and notes that religious beliefs can be essential regardless of denomination 
noting that it can be also a hindering and destructive element in a peace process. 
Appleby (1998. 42) talks more deeply about the dual essence of religion that complicates the 
matters and raises questions and problems. Religion’s role is ambiguous and it can be used for good 
and bad intentions. (Ibid.) Even though historically there is a record of religiously inspired violence 




Appleby highlights also the importance of fully encompassing various authoritative interpretations 
of religious traditions to be able to evolve practices that support peace and reconciliation rather than 
war and retaliation. To understand the difference between the approaches and uses of the sources is 
vital to be able to undermine the negative and promote the positive influence of religion in conflict 
resolution. (1998. 43) 
Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana (2009. 199) view that religion itself is a resource when it comes 
to mediation. Appleby (1998. 42) argues that religious actors have a critical and positive role in the 
world when they remain religious, and reminds that religious extremists with negative intentions are 
only a minority in religious communities. The wisdom of religious tradition is built up over 
generations and is thus vast and complex unit. Because of these various foundational sources it 
takes time to grasp the deeper meaning and their significance. (Ibid. 42) 
Faith-based actors have trust and legitimacy that can be seen as a source of leverage for good. As 
respected and even admired people they can attain leverage over certain parties (Bercovitch and 
Kadayifci-Orellana 2009. 199). The more trusted the mediator is by the parties in the conflict the 
more tangible and intangible resources the mediator is enable to use. To be trusted can be also in 
other words to be perceived as legitimate. (Ibid. 183) Relatively new phenomenon is to use religion 
to promote peace and to develop interfaith dialogue between the conflicting groups through 
enhancing communication and even developing common ethical principles. Bercovitch and 
Kadayifci (2009) argue that through interfaith dialogue faith-based mediators can tackle the difficult 
issues at stake in a manner that their secular counterparts would not be capable of. (Ibid. 199) 
In their article Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana (2009) talk about the role of religion and 
religious actors in the process of mediation. Even though in faith-based mediation leverage is 
important, they argue that the leverage of faith-based mediation has a different meaning and content 
than more traditional forms of mediation. This can be connected with the theory of Reid (2015) 
about credibility leverage. Nevertheless Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana (2009. 187) add to the 
explanation that faith-based actors have unique moral and spiritual leverage that comes from the 
reputation of the faith-based actors following respected values. According to Appleby the success of 
religious NGOs relies on the individuals who have inner strength, charisma, and are courageous. 
Therefore the resources and wisdom of the local practitioners and religious traditions can be used as 
a source for education and training of religious peacebuilding. He also notes that the scholars and 
analysts with opposite views on the rationale of religion and its position in peace and conflict, work 




Grad (2014. 66) refers to Daniel Philpott (2007) when talking about the elements of religion that 
provide power and thus have potential in terms of social integration. Grad claims there are two 
sources of leverage, which are connectivity and holism. Through connectivity religious actors are 
able to bring together people from different strands of life. The holistic element of religion brings 
out the possibility of encompassing the whole community into the transformational process. (Grad 
2014. 66)  
Faith-based actors can have significant financial and human resources. They have well established 
networks regionally and globally that they can use to get institutional, financial and human 
resources. Also according to Appleby (1998. 41) the religious communities that consist of 
widespread networks on different levels of society can have a benefit from this when they take part 
in faith-based conflict resolution and consequently are usually privileged by popular credibility. 
They have access to community members that work as mid-range leaders that can reach out to 
grassroots as well as top level leaders. The agents who are able to communicate with people of 
different backgrounds in the society are viewed as more effective in influencing conflict 
transformation towards sustainable peace. (Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana 2009. 188) For 
example Sant’Egidio in Mozambique exploited their contacts with the government officials of Italy 
and the Vatican as well as the leaders of the parties in civil war. Their involvement as social service 
providers enabled them to influence the attitudes and behavior of the political leaders as well as 
monitoring and shaping the developments that succeeded. (Appleby 1998. 41) 
It is relevant to connect the leverage of faith-based mediation to the international level because of 
the transnational linkages that religion entails. (Johnstone and Svensson 2013) The Community of 
Sant’Egidio as a faith-based mediator with international character is a good example of this as its 
communities have spread around the world. Nevertheless the Lay Roman Catholic Community of 
Sant’Egidio is not the only transnational religious community engaging in conflict transformation 
through mediation, social services, and good offices in the war torn countries. There is a full range 
of efforts under the term religious peacebuilding. For example the Mennonite Central Committee, 
the World Conference on Religion and Peace, and the Society of Engaged Buddhists are religious 
NGOs operating on global level. They conduct workshops and courses about the religious resources 
for conflict transformation. They can also facilitate communication and dialogue among 
communities that have been historically divided by ethnicity and religion. (Appleby 1998. 39) 
Time is one of the resources of faith-based mediators. Signing a peace agreement is not enough for 




peace agreement. The advantage of faith-based groups and religious leaders is that they often have 
historical ties and involvement in community affairs and the interaction within the parties and the 
diverse actors within the society is not only limited to the conflict. Historical ties indicate 
commitment thus accumulating credibility and legitimacy of the mediator. The continuity of the 
engagement also after the conflict is seen as important aspect of faith-based mediation. Long term 
commitment requires time which, can be viewed as a resource for the mediation efforts. (Bercovitch 
and Kadayifci-Orellana 2009. 189) 
Johnstone and Svensson (2013. 561) argue that religious actors in general have high degree of 
legitimacy and credibility, and these qualities can benefit their ability to act as faith-based 
mediators. Some NGOs are able to gain access to high government officials depending on their 
religious leaders who have prestigious reputation and are seen as honest persons and having morally 
strong principles. Regimes lacking legitimacy can exploit the fear of religious fundamentalism thus 
undermining the credibility of religion as peaceful force in conflict resolution. Still religious actors 
have potential to act as advocates for justice and to be a powerful source for creating stabile 
political and prosperous economic and social conditions among peoples. (Appleby 1998. 42) 
The legacy of religious peacemaking in the contemporary religious realm to mention a few are for 
example Christian ethicists who cultivate the notions of just war and pacifist traditions. Muslim 
theologians demonstrate the adaptability of Islamic law defending its integrity and priority to create 
just and stable Muslim societies. Scholars and religious leaders of various religions translate their 
respective traditional wisdoms and cultural values into cross-cultural norms in search of 
establishing religious human rights. (Appleby 1998. 39) There is also connection with the secular 
and religious thus the Community of Sant’Egidio basically combines in its work secular and 
religious aspects through its members as well as emphasizing the humane way of approaching 
mediation rather than the religious aspects would be forced upon the mediation process. 
Faith-based mediators have been involved in mediation historically and they have become 
increasingly active and visible in the mediation processes since the 1990s. This can be also seen in 
the faith-based mediation by the Community of Sant’Egidio that began its work with mediation in 
the 1990s and is still continuing its mediation efforts today. They are able to have leverage through 
information that is useful for the mediation of a conflict. According to research done by Saadia 
Touval, mediation success can be related to identity, motivations and resources of the mediators. 
Jacob Bercovitch emphasizes the identity of the mediator that can be for example a religious 




attributes of the mediator such as resources, strategies, and motivations of faith-based actors in 
mediation. (Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana 2009. 176) Leverage as a resource of a mediator 
entails that the mediator is able to become a relevant actor in the peace process (Ibid. 180). 
Johnstone and Svensson (2013. 557) argue that faith-based communities constitute an alternative, 
and unique possibilities for organization of the civil society beside the official governmental 
structures of a state. Also on the level of deep-rooted sentiments and cognitive structures faith-
based mediators can benefit from their unique social and psychological perceptions (Ibid. 560). The 
intangible resources that can be withdrawn from religion can include values, rituals, and historical 
examples (Ibid. 561). Religion is still an aspect of culture and tradition that people can depend on as 
a stable source of identity when other structures in the conflict affected society have fallen apart. A 
church or a mosque is a major institution which the state cannot have a total control of thus 
religious institutions can serve as alternative moral authorities to corrupt regimes. (Appleby 1998. 
41) Similarly Johnstone and Svensson (2013. 561) refer to the prevalence of religious actors in the 
society particularly in case where the official structures are defected because of conflict. Faith-
based institutions can have a special advantage because of the unique role that religion has in the 
social life of the people. Consequently Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana (2009. 195) argue that 
faith-based actors can significantly contribute to the official and formal mediation. Legitimacy and 
leverage are found to have a great impact on the outcome of mediation also in the context of faith-
based mediation. (Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana 2009) In this master thesis the sources of 
leverage are under scrutiny. 
Elite can promote their own underlying interests under the veil of religion. It implies that religion 
itself does not contribute to the state of affairs within societies but rather the way it is used makes 
the difference. In this way religion can be used to gain greater legitimacy and chance of influencing 
the population thus strengthening the power base as Toft (2007) argues especially relying on the 
case of Islam. With similar conclusions De Juan (2015) states that religious leaders provide norms 
to the people to follow in everyday life thus religious leaders are responsible of how they interpret 
and then communicate specific narratives and guidance to their followers. Then again the 
interpretations can be misunderstood by the common people who can be manipulated by the elite. 
That is an argument of Scott Appleby (2000) who calls it religious illiteracy. In this way also the 
common people have their responsibility to think to themselves is it more profitable to use their 
faith for peace or conflict. Nevertheless according to Appleby (2000) the inherent ambivalence of 




Community of Sant’Egidio and numerous religious entities are working on. (Silvestri and Mayall 
2015. 24) 
2.5.1. Summary of the main points of sources of leverage in faith-based mediation 
In summary faith-based mediators can draw leverage from several unique sources available to them 
through the resources, strategies, and motivations connected to their identity. Religion itself can be 
used as a resource for mediation (Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana 2009. 199) such as wisdom 
from religious traditions (Appleby 1998. 42). Religion provides stable source of alternative moral 
authority (Appleby 1998. 41) in a war torn conflict environment. Through connectivity and holism 
that religion entails it can bring people encompass the whole society and connect people with 
different backgrounds (Grad 2014. 66). Faith-based actors have inner strength, charisma, and 
courage (Appleby 1998. 44). They are also seen as trusted and legitimate thus they have moral and 
spiritual leverage since they have a reputation to follow respected values (Bercovitch and 
Kadayifci-Orellana 2009. 199). For what purposes faith-based actors use their leverage is up to 
them to decide nevertheless they can use their leverage for good. Therefore faith-based mediators 





The methodology chapter consists of explaining the chosen approach to research, which is a 
qualitative study on three cases of the faith-based mediation by the Community of Sant’Egidio. The 
research method for data collection is a desk study. Furthermore it is a relevant way of collecting 
data for the topic. As a final point the validity and reliability of the data gained through the desk 
study method are considered. 
3.1. Reasons for choosing qualitative approach 
The decision to choose qualitative approach and especially empirical case study analysis in this 
master thesis as the way to conduct research is backed up for example by Bercovitch, Jackson and 
Wells (2009. 37) who argue that empirical studies on mediation using actual descriptions of 
mediation cases represent the most fruitful approach to study mediation. 
The rationale for choosing these particular cases is that in the data those are presented as a case 
where the Community of Sant’Egidio was a facilitator in a mediation process, and they were able to 
influence the peace process positively in certain extent. Furthermore the cases can be seen as 
representative or typical cases (Bryman 2012. 70) that exemplify the faith-based mediation in a 
different contexts since the focal concept of leverage is also dependent on the context thus choosing 
three cases gives more varied account of the possibilities in which the Community of Sant’Egidio 
have been mediating. Additionally the cases can be described as critical cases which are used to get 
better understanding of the circumstances where the theory of faith-based leverage can be detected 
(Ibid.). 
Moreover Bercovitch, Jackson and Wells (2009. 37) support the use of contingency approach, in 
which the outcome of mediation is dependent upon the conflict environment. That is why it is 
important to study the context of the conflict as well. Furthermore the particular resources of 
Sant’Egidio and their approach to mediation are contingent to the context of the conflict. In the 
context of the conflicts in Mozambique, Liberia, and Casamance they were able to engage in the 
mediation process effectively thus in those cases it is possible to study the research questions of the 
thesis. 
3.2. Case study method 
Even though my research is conducted as qualitative research it is noted by Yin (1984. 25) in Zainal 




useful method for doing research when it is necessary to study issues at hand in depth and in a 
holistic way. Conducting research through case study method researcher can overcome the 
limitations of quantitative methods such as uncovering information beyond statistical results. When 
exploring complex issues, case study method enables to get understanding of the behavior and 
conditions from the perspective of the actors involved. Case study is used to examine data closely in 
a specific context. As Yin (1984. 23) is quoted by Zainal (2007. 2) the case study as a research 
method is defined as an investigation of a contemporary real life phenomenon through multiple 
sources of evidence. This describes also the method of the master thesis in question. Usually there is 
a limited geographical area and limited number of individuals under the study, like for instance in 
my case study the mediation by the Community of Sant’Egidio is studied in three different contexts 
of peace processes. (Zainal 2007) 
3.2.1. Challenges connected to case studies and my own case study description and challenges 
Zainal (2007. 5) referring to Yin (1984) presents three types of criticism towards case study method 
that include criticism over the lack of robustness, lack of generalizing conclusion, and the length 
and difficulties while conducting a case study related to the management and organization of the 
data later. 
This case study is intrinsic thus it is studied for its own sake (Zainal 2007. 4) to get knowledge of a 
specific NGO in a specific peace process. A case study in which data is observed on micro level 
(Zainal 2007. 2) through a single case is thus the most appropriate method for this thesis. As noted 
by Stake (1995) in Bryman (2012. 66) the complexity and the particular nature of the case is under 
consideration when using a single case study, hence generalized conclusions are not the main focus 
of the study here. According to Tellis (1997) in Zainal (2007. 2) a link between the theoretical 
framework and the case study has to exist. Therefore using a case study it can show the theories in 
connection with a realistic case of faith-based mediation which is important for answering the 
research questions of the thesis. In this case there is one unit of analysis that is studied to understand 
it in depth (Bryman 2012. 12). The chosen cases of faith-based mediation by the Community of 
Sant’Egidio are analyzed intensively and in detail (Bryman 2012. 66). The cases have been chosen 
from different decades to get a wider perspective of the mediation efforts of the Catholic lay NGO. 
The mediation in Mozambique was the first time the Community of Sant’Egidio became involved 
in mediation. Liberia is historically between the two other cases chosen to be studied in this thesis. 
The mediation in the Casamance region of Senegal is a more recent case and thus a contemporary 
real life phenomenon where faith-based mediation has been able to transform the conflict towards 




based mediation by the Catholic Lay NGO, Sant’Egidio. (Bryman 2012. 69) Furthermore it can be 
described as theory-guided idiographic case study since the case is interpreted through a theoretical 
framework of leverage in faith-based mediation (Levy 2009. 73). 
The master thesis reflects a deductive approach in relation between theory and research since on the 
basis of the theoretical framework empirical data is gathered from the specific case. (Bryman 2012. 
24). Other research methods are employed to collect data since case study method does not provide 
data but is a method in terms of exploring a specific case thus here the faith-based mediation by the 
Community of Sant’Egidio in the three mediation processes (Bryman 2012. 45). 
3.3. Desk study and document study as research design 
To collect data the desk study research method was employed. According to Paul Hague (2006), 
desk study method refers to secondary data that is collected without field work thus searching 
libraries and the internet furthermore it can also include for example telephone interviews. I tried a 
couple of times during the research process to contact the Community of Sant’Egidio for possibly 
making some interviews and to get more information about their mediation such as archived reports 
or other internal documents. Because these attempts were unsuccessful therefore I relied only on 
doing secondary analysis of other documents available to me. 
3.3.1. General challenges of document studies 
In general document as a term can mean a variety of different kinds of sources of data. Those can be 
personal letters or diaries, official state documents, documents from private sources such as 
produced by an organization, documents from mass-media and from the Internet. (Bryman 2012. 
543) Secondary analysis of data is an inexpensive way to collect data moreover there is plenty of 
qualified quantitative and qualitative data collected by researchers and organizations that is in the 
reach of a student. (Ibid. 311) 
The challenges come from the starting point that the documents were not produced exactly for the 
researcher but the information from documents is assembled, interpreted and analyzed by the 
researcher according to their study interests. It can be a protracted and frustrating process to find the 
most relevant documents for the purposes of the researcher as well as uncovering the meaning of 
the gathered materials. Contrariwise to the description by Bryman (2012. 543) in my research I 
have also used documents such as academic articles and books, which have been written for the 




On one hand the lack of reactiveness of the data, in other words the relationship with the data and 
the researcher being non-reactive, can be seen as a limitation in document research. (Ibid.) On the 
other hand it can be also a strong point to use unobtrusive sources of data such in order to get the 
information as it is without the researcher affecting the collected data. (Bryman 2012. 325-327) 
The same limitation also touches upon my master thesis because all documents such as articles and 
books are written for other purposes than the specific interests of my research. In my research I 
have used archived materials as it is one type of the unobtrusive methods distinguished by Webb et 
al. (1966) in Bryman (2012. 325). Nevertheless while doing secondary analysis of existing data 
there is an advantage of developing new interpretations on the topic (Bryman 2012. 315). 
When conducting research base on documents online sometimes there might be issues concerned 
with the authenticity of the mass media outputs. Usually the outputs can be easily deemed as 
genuine but sometimes it is difficult to find credible authorship for the document in question. In 
these cases it might be questioned whether the author can be trusted on this issue to have written an 
accurate account on the topic. Nevertheless the error and distortion in the content is more important 
to uncover for the analysis and representativeness in this sense rarely an issue (Bryman 2012. 553) I 
also encountered a few sources such described above but I agree that the content of the source was 
more important than the authorship and could be easily checked through triangulation of other 
sources. Furthermore the issue might be also contested thus having opposing views is normal. 
Bryman (2012. 550) acknowledges the difficulty of getting access to the private sources of 
documents by companies or organizations that are not in the public domain. The same challenge 
was also faced while conducting research for this master thesis as mentioned before in this chapter. 
Furthermore the challenge to get information on the mediation by Sant’Egidio also reflects their 
approach to mediation in which confidentiality is valued. Thus there are no substantial differences 
in the published outsider sources. The difficulty to get detailed information about Sant’Egidio is 
noted also by Fisas (2015b). Documents from private sources are according to Bryman (2012. 551) 
usually clear and comprehensible thus they provide authentic and meaningful data. Nevertheless 
Bryman reminds that the documents are written with a particular agenda in mind, in other words a 
certain point of view is reflected through the text. (Ibid.) I found this also in the context of the 
updates by Sant’Egidio that were always positive and encouraging that the peace process is making 
progress. Nevertheless when it comes to the general reports about the peace process by Vicenç Fisas 




process was progressing as well as other critical documents from blogs or other organizations about 
the peace process. 
3.3.2. Choosing of documents and why and how I found and studied them 
The sources of data for the thesis come from qualitative as well as quantitative research and 
examining documents on the peace processes in the three countries and the Community of 
Sant’Egidio. The data was collected from secondary data mostly from articles, books and reports 
online. I searched for documents online using Google, Google Scholar, and the University’s 
database Oria. As part of daily research work I also was following news on the topic, and at times 
browsing books in the libraries of the university. 
For the case of mediation by Sant’Egidio there was plenty of information online as well as in books 
because of its status as one of the first and most known cases of faith-based mediation. Nevertheless 
the books had to be ordered as interlibrary loans. Those came mostly from Sweden and the US. By 
chance I found one book in Tromsø from the University’s library for psychology and law, which 
had an interesting article by Pierre Anouilh (2011) on the mediation by Sant’Egidio. This article 
especially offered a different approach comparing to other sources and was thus valuable addition 
for the thesis. 
For the mediation process by the Community of Sant’Egidio in Liberia there was to be found only 
one relevant source with more details that was a book edited by Roberto Morozzo della Rocca in 
which there was an article on the peace process in Liberia by Vittorio Scelzo (2010) who is also 
member of the Community of Sant’Egidio. In other sources there were shorter mentions on the 
case, and the sources found in Italian language were left out because the same information was also 
in English and thus easier to understand. 
Despite of the limitations on getting enough information from a more recent case not studied as 
much as for example the case of Mozambique, the faith-based mediation by the Community of 
Sant’Egidio in the peace process of Casamance was chosen as a case study in this master thesis. 
There were also limitations in language of the documents since some information on the case I 
found in French language but I relied on the English sources, which I could understand without 
concerns for translation errors or misunderstandings. Nevertheless because of the successful 
previous mediation case there was to be found relevant information about the Community of 
San’Egidio that could be used for this case as well. The more recent case with less direct analysis 
available on the case also enabled to apply the theory to the case in a more original way, connecting 




Some of the materials studied for this master thesis were already familiar to me because of earlier 
research on the topic of mediation, such as the Yearbooks on Peace Processes by Vicenç Fisas 
(2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016) all the same they provided important background information on the 
peace process in Casamance. Interviews of the mediators of Sant’Egidio in magazines published 
online as well as in books were also used. A master thesis previously done on faith-based mediation 
by Nikolai Hegertun (2010) in the University of Oslo provided also a good starting point to gather 
data about the organization and their approach to mediation. 
3.3.3. Triangulation 
Tuomi and Sarajärvi (2002. 141-142) in Saaranen-Kauppinen and Puusniekka (2006) define 
triangulation simply as combining different methods, theories, sources, and researchers within a 
study. Combining different perspectives on the topic can lead to exploration of contradictory 
conclusions on the issue in focus nevertheless it adds the reliability of the study. From the four main 
types of triangulation, distinguished by Denzin (1978) in Saaranen-Kauppinen and Puusniekka 
(2006), two types of triangulation were used in conducting this master thesis that were data 
triangulation and theory triangulation. 
In theory triangulation different theoretical perspectives such as ones by Reid (2015) and Zartman 
and Touval (1985) that have a different view on how to define leverage were used. As well as the 
division to transformative and problem-solving mediation by Spangler (2003) and the multi-track 
diplomacy approach by Diamond and McDonald (IMTD 2016) that can include various kinds of 
actors in the mediation process. Data triangulation was used conducting qualitative research on 
different sources of data such as academic articles, articles from the media, books published by 
Sant’Egidio, and reports from the academia and practitioners and organizations that deal with 
conflict resolution, such as lessons learned report written by Fisas (2015b) for the Norwegian 
Peacebuilding Resource Center (NOREF). 
3.4. Validity and reliability of the data 
It is important for the establishment and assessment of the quality of the research to look at the 
aspects of validity and reliability. However it is contested among the academia whether the same 
criteria for quantitative research is relevant for qualitative research as well (Bryman 2012. 389). 
Qualitative researchers have had the tendency to use the terms in very similar ways to quantitative 
researchers. Nonetheless issues concerning validity and reliability of data collected through 
qualitative research have been considered together as the trustworthiness and authenticity by 




view of assessing qualitative research is critical against the realist view of having only one absolute 
truth instead they argue that it is possible to get into several possible conclusions. (Bryman 2012) 
The validity and the reliability of the studied documents in this master thesis are assessed according 
to the criteria by Lincoln and Guba. Trustworthiness is made up of credibility, transferability, 
dependability, and confirmability. The first criterion which is credibility is in my case taken care of 
with the use of theory triangulation and data triangulation. I found few inconsistencies within the 
data or passages where had to be found more information to make it more clear nevertheless 
triangulation of the data was useful in this task. Second criterion, the transferability of the research, 
is a concern since my study is focused on an intensive study of a unique case nevertheless Lincoln 
and Guba referring to Geertz (1985. 316) suggest that producing a “thick description” of a specific 
case can be enough of a database for the transferability of the findings to other contexts. This is of 
course the goal of this master thesis to get as thick description of the case as possible. In my opinion 
relevant information has been found from the available documents but it would have been possibly 
an advantage to get the chance to include additionally internal documents from the Community of 
Sant’Egidio in my study. The third criterion is dependability which is the parallel term for reliability 
in quantitative research. This criterion of trustworthiness means that a complete account of the 
research process would be recorded and audited. Most importantly my supervisor has audited my 
research process. Additionally my classmates have reviewed my theory chapter and provided me 
with feedback as I took part in the chapter seminar of my faculty at the Centre for Peace Studies. I 
also took part in a conference in connection with the International Winter School at Petrozavodsk 
State University in December 2016 where I presented my master thesis and got comments from 
students and teachers. The criterion of confirmability is concerned with the objectivity of the 
researcher. As a researcher I am aware of this and want to act in good faith excluding personal 
values and theoretical inclinations that would affect the conduct of the research and its conclusions. 
(Bryman 2012. 390, 392) My own overall impression of the reliability of the documents studied for 
this master thesis is that they are trustworthy and reliable sources since most of them are from 
official sources as well as from academia so that it was clear and comprehensible thus easy to read 
and find the authorship of the documents and subsequently the quality of the data gathered is 
sufficient for the needs of this master thesis. 
Following the criteria of authenticity by Lincoln and Guba it is thus a wide group of issues 
concerning the political impact of the research at the same time emphasizing the practical outcomes 
of it. They divide authenticity into ontological, educative, catalytic and tactical authenticity, and 




controversial. Nonetheless I find all the presented themes relevant and one of them applicable for 
my thesis. That is fairness which can be shown in the attempt to represent impartially the 
viewpoints of all the parties taking part in the three peace processes even though the main focus is 
on the Community of Sant’Egidio, and in the cases of Mozambique and Liberia the main sources 
are written by the mediators themselves, which could influence the way the efforts are presented. 





4. THE FAITH-BASED MEDIATION APPROACH BY THE 
COMMUNITY OF SANT’EGIDIO 
In this chapter the data on the religious aspects affecting the mediation approach of the Community 
of Sant’Egidio is presented and analyzed through the theoretical framework of the thesis. This 
chapter concentrates on the first research question, which is: How do the religious aspects of the 
Catholic Lay NGO Sant’Egidio shape their approach to mediation? 
The structure of the chapter follows from the research question. First the religious aspects of the 
Community of Sant’Egidio are presented and analyzed to explain how they shape the mediation 
approach of the Community of Sant’Egidio. 
4.1. Religious aspects shaping their approach to mediation 
In the case of the Community of Sant’Egidio religion is a source of motivation for their actions in 
the society and thus relevant matter shaping their approach to mediation. Furthermore the 
substantive aspects such as religious habits and Christian values can serve as motivation for the 
faith-based mediation by the Community of Sant’Egidio such as the elements of religious beliefs, 
Christian values and doctrine of Sant’Egidio but to understand how those religious aspects shape 
the mediation approach by Sant’Egidio it can be viewed through the functional approach to religion 
thus their practice of faith-based mediation.  
The main goals of the community are related to its identity as a religious organization. The direct 
expression of the three disciplines, which are prayer, service to the poor, and friendship, are 
encouraged to be practiced in everyday lives of the members of the community. (Bartoli 2001) 
Their mediation work is done following from these other activities that stem from the religious 
background of Sant’Egidio. 
In his speech Bartoli articulates that the Catholic foundations of the peacemaking by the 
Community of Sant’Egidio are of great importance thus he explains this through using Latin words 
Communio, Traditio, Romanitas, and Pietas. (Bartoli 2001) 
To be part of the Communio means that people are part of the big Catholic family that stretches all 
over the world. It is also a recognition referring to the limitations and responsibilities that come 
from the Catholic doctrine and living through its teachings. The Community is thus also ready to 
respond to diverse requests of its members. Practically the skills and qualities related to the 




and stop, and hospitality. (Bartoli 2001) These guidelines of listening, relationships, and hospitality 
are also a fundamental basis for their mediation work. 
Traditio is relevant to the evangelical community in a way that it is in debt to the Catholic Church 
for giving them the Gospel. The first traditio that is recognized as foundational part of the 
Community is reference to the Scriptures. The document by the II Vatican Council, the Dogmatic 
Constitution Dei Verbum is a profound element of the Community of Sant’Egidio. In their 
mediation they refer to the importance and deeply Catholic traditions of prayer. Thus prayer for the 
members of Sant’Egidio is silent listening of the Word of God. Relating it to their work for peace 
they emphasize the pre-mediation search for “the hidden purpose”. Revering traditions Sant’Egidio 
is also open for innovation and changes. Traditions for Sant’Egidio are not narrow-minded 
conservatism but change occurs from the center to periphery and vice versa as reformations are part 
of the Catholic Church. Bartoli (2001) defends the hierarchical structure because it allows 
connections with the center and periphery. The role of laity as well as the role of bishops and the 
role of the Holy See has been transforming as an expression of the plasticity of the Catholic Church. 
Sant’Egidio then is an expression of this characteristic of adapting, responding, and incorporating 
change. Such as Rome was not made in one day Sant’Egidio has learned from the traditions the 
importance of long-term commitment. (Bartoli 2001) 
In the foreword by Cardinal Thedore McCarrick in Riccardi (2009) he states that deep spirituality of 
the ecclesial movement and prayer is at the heart of Sant’Egidio and the foundation of its work for 
peace in the world. According to Riccardi prayer is the absolute priority of Sant’Egidio (Ibid. 97). 
In the view of Sant’Egidio prayer is a source of strength and therefore everything is possible 
through prayer when you have faith in its power. They view it as powerful source for change 
although it may appear weak. (McCarrick in Riccardi 2009) Sant’Egidio acts on weak means of 
prayer, solidarity, personal encounter, and dialogue. From their experiences in mediation they 
started to believe in the weak power of prayer as well as that non-violence can have transformative 
and persuasive power. (Ibid. 8) Furthermore Riccardi (2009. 9) adds that all religions have weak 
strength because peace is holy. Through being curious about the world people can learn to see 
beyond themselves. (Ibid. 9) Religion for the Community of Sant’Egidio is a way of life thus in 
their view Christian life is not something that is learned by heart. (Riccardi 2009. 93) Moreover 
they mobilize their peaceful message through the tradition of prayer. 
Romanitas means the appreciation of the local dimension of the place of origin and the roots in 




place for people with different backgrounds and a cosmopolitan crowd. Rome is a special place for 
Christianity since it is a center of the Catholic Church and historically linked to the present with its 
apostolic succession, and linked to the world with spiritual communion of believers. Relating to the 
tradition of reformations of the Catholic Church Sant’Egidio has taken its history and geography as 
sacred. They understand the way of being Roman as a responsibility and the spiritual communion of 
believers have decided to live their lives the Roman way in the communities all over the world. It is 
a quality of the Community and a point of reference to live according to their three disciplines; 
prayer, service to the poor, and friendship. With this history they learned to be open and welcoming 
towards others such as other Christians, people with other religious background than themselves, as 
well as the people who are non-believers. (Bartoli 2001) Thus living the Roman way is about being 
welcoming towards people who might be seen as “the other”. Neverthless for the Community of 
Sant’Egidio the other are seen in a humane way just like they would be part of them. 
Function of the Pietas is about the love for the poor that is the base for the peacemaking efforts of 
the Community of Sant’Egidio. In the saying “war is the mother of all sufferings and the poor are 
the victims of it” the different opportunities in the times of war by the rich and the poor are 
acknowledged. According to Bartoli on one hand the rich can live well and benefit from war but on 
the other hand the poor do not have power, resources, or means to escape, and thus the Community 
of Sant’Egidio sees it as their duty to defend the ones who cannot defend themselves. (Bartoli 2001) 
4.1.1. Realist view to mediation 
The Community of Sant’Egidio has a realist view of faith-based mediation and peacemaking in 
general. Sant’Egidio is inspired by the Catholic tradition but works distinctly from any associations 
or movements by the Catholic Church (Riccardi 2010. 8). Riccardi (2010) describes Sant’Egidio 
rather as a peacemaker than a pacifist Christian community because Sant’Egidio also acts and 
intervenes for the moral and religious value of peace in conflict situations thus Sant’Egidio bases its 
approach to realism on the ground while working for peace (Ibid. 9). According to Mario Giro 
(2012) the most valuable asset that anyone can have is peace. Furthermore after many years of 
peacemaking by Sant’Egidio they have come to the conviction that peace is always possible. (Giro 
2012. 92) For the community of Sant’Egidio peace is passion not a profession. Their persuasive 
force is the selflessness and personal disinterest (Riccardi 2010. 16) They do not see war as 
something natural for humans. They emphasize the background and personal stories of the 
individuals, groups, and nations and the understanding of their consciousness and perceptions of the 
reality they live in. According to Giro reasons for any conflict can be related to fear, distrust, 




resentment, and victimization. For Sant’Egidio it is very important to be patient and to know the art 
of listening. Additionally humility is needed in order to hit the deep nerve that possibly ignites the 
steps for peace. Sant’Egidio also sees as essential the experience, background knowledge, and 
political insight. Nevertheless it is not enough thus one has to transcend from the egocentric vision 
to learn to build common ground to regain a sense of shared destiny. According to Giro no one is 
innocent in war and everyone has responsibility that should evoke humility. The friendship with the 
poor has taught the Community of Sant’Egidio to engage with people who are different who 
sometimes can be seen as the other. Similarly to the notion of Galtung (Silvestri and Mayall 2015. 
9) about structural violence Giro states that no society is truly in peace as long as marginalization, 
segregation, and exclusion are practiced. (Giro 2012. 93) 
4.1.2. Leverage from religion 
Initially the founders of the Community of Sant’Egidio were deeply influenced by Marxism and the 
Catholic doctrine (Anouilh 2011. 106). One of the talents of the founding members of Sant’Egidio 
is “culture”, through which they were helping kids with school subjects when they began to work 
on the word of God (Riccardi 2009. 1-2). Culture of love in the Community of Sant’Egidio means 
something that is not elitist but nourished by experiences, knowledge, reading, and conversations 
(Riccardi 2009. 9). The international network of Sant’Egidio testifies that common destiny for all 
people is possible, in the sense that there is no “other” but just human beings even with their 
cultural differences. (Riccardi 2009. 6) The Community of Sant’Egidio uses religion as a way to 
connect to people outside their own social sphere and consequently religion legitimizes their efforts 
to help the poor without personal interest. 
Religion is seen as one source of leverage by the Community of Sant’Egidio. According to Riccardi 
it would be unwieldy to think that human and financial resources would be the most important. 
Nevertheless a great resource for Sant’Egidio is its “interest in the plight of the world” stemming 
from the evangelical spirituality and a view that war is an evil. Their mediation efforts are basically 
about healing divisions between the conflicting parties, creating a framework to guarantee a 
peaceful future, demonstrating that there is nothing worse than war, as well as providing an outlet 
for the people living in the state of war. The foundations for the faith-based mediation by 
Sant’Egidio are human and spiritual. In their approach to faith-based mediation Sant’Egidio uses 
simple yet sophisticated tools of dialogue that are effective, adaptable, and incisive. (Riccardi 2010. 
11) Sant’Egidio works towards developing human relationships and reasoned political debate 
rooted in strong moral legitimacy of the parties in conflict to want peace and want it quickly 




for solution there has to be political will from the parties to want peace. The Community of 
Sant’Egidio faces challenges that come from the nature of politics, culture, and perspective of the 
conflicting parties. Because of this it is challenging to build reasons and guarantees of trust between 
the conflicting parties. Furthermore at least partial change is needed from the side of the parties to 
either agree, compromise, or make a decision to live peacefully together. (Riccardi 2010. 13) Thus 
the faith-based mediation by Sant’Egidio also shows that it is a main challenge for the mediator to 
change the mentality and the mindset of the parties in conflict. Through providing guarantees for 
freedom and survival in the form of political framework for the future as well as creating 
mechanisms, institutions, and processes enabling implementation of the agreement and security for 
the weaker party they try to convince the parties that peace is possible. (Riccardi 2010. 14)  
Learning from their experiences a possible method of mediation is presented by Giro. He notes to 
the nature of the Community of Sant’Egidio as a mediator. Thus they do not have the political, 
economic, and military agenda that powerful states can have. (Giro 2012. 96) In the traditional 
sense Sant’Egidio is a weak mediator like Beardsley (2008) has described nevertheless to lack the 
agenda of this kind it does not mean that they would not have the leverage at their disposal for 
example in the political and economic sphere through their influential connections. According to 
Giro (2012. 97) the strength of a weak mediator is that the conflicting parties see it as a guarantee to 
be able to express themselves more freely without pressure. 
4.1.3. Ownership of the conflicting parties to the peace process 
Sant’Egidio does not set limitations or deadlines in its mediation approach. They emphasize the 
genuine ownership of the parties in the mediation process. They also want to create an informal yet 
confidential setting for the mediation. They acknowledge that it is necessary to give enough time for 
settling differences between the parties. The focus is on facilitative strategies of mediation and no 
directive measures are used by the Community of Sant’Egidio. (Giro 2012. 97) 
Giro defines the model of mediation by the Community of Sant’Egidio as personalization, 
confidentiality, absence of pressure, and furthermore the conflicting parties have to have the 
ownership of the peace process. This is because the outcome to be sustainable the parties have to 
take responsibility of it. Giro sees it apparent that when the parties have greater freedom it leads to 
greater responsibility as well. According to Giro directive measures that he calls as “a threatening 
form” that is drawn from the position of power that the mediator has. It includes a double edged 
sword since it can be used by the parties as an excuse to avoid taking responsibility. Taking the 




outcome and the conflicting parties can try to exploit this. Nevertheless Giro argues that especially 
in the beginning of the peace process pressure can be helpful yet it can become damaging as well. 
Consequently the parties can get the feeling of lack of engagement in the signing and accepting of 
an agreement or that they do not feel sufficiently involved in the implementation of the agreement. 
(Giro 2012. 97) 
Mario Giro argues that the civil society mediators are perceived as impartial and having approach 
that is less top-down than for example states as mediators. Consequently the perception of an 
impartial mediator is connected to the feeling of the parties being more in control and fully involved 
and responsible for the peace process. (Giro 2012. 98) 
According to Giro the key to effective mediation is in the voluntary nature of mediation but 
contrariwise the international community has its own rules that do not include free choice with 
negative consequences such as creating a climate of mistrust. In the view of the Community of 
Sant’Egidio, mediation to be effective, it has to fade to the background when necessary and to have 
the most minimal touch as possible. The mediator should have the attitude of humility. All in all for 
the mediator’s ability to affect the peace process positively it is important to be able to engage the 
conflicting parties to be responsible for the peace process. (Ibid.) 
4.1.4. Listening and time for reflection 
The mediation efforts by the Community of Sant’Egidio include patience that is not only moral but 
necessary for listening and understanding. (Giro 2012. 102) Giro also notes that especially in the 
conflicts in the African continent aptitude for listening can be used as an important tool in 
mediation. In the stages of mediation when the mediator is getting to know the unfamiliar situation 
they might have to wait for the parties to be ready to talk and explain themselves. It might seem at 
the time pointless or illogical but he compares it to the facilitation of a learning process. Through 
listening each other a bridge can be built between the parties in conflict and the mediator. Humility 
as well as an appropriate amount of respect is needed in the learning process. (Giro 2012. 100) 
Similarly to the theory by Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana (2009. 189) on faith-based mediation 
regarding time as a resource of a mediator also Sant’Egidio views that time and its management is 
essential in a peace process. Time is needed to grow an extensive network of useful connections. 
Time has to be managed scrupulously when forging relationships and faithfully following a 
situation on the ground. Compared to officials, diplomats, and politicians the Community of 
Sant’Egidio has more time in its disposal. Giro stresses time and patience is necessary in the 




(Giro 2012. 99) Contrary to the official mediation in which speed and efficiency are valued the 
Community of Sant’Egidio can have a different idea on measuring credibility since it is free from 
the constraints of political agenda and strict time limitations. The mediation by Sant’Egidio is 
marked by flexibility in their work that is a feature of NGO mediation. For example it can take 
years getting in touch with the parties in conflict and creating a reliable and credible contact. 
Additionally to viewing time from the perspective of the Community of Sant’Egidio time is also 
regarded important for the parties to reflect. When they mediate they see the long silences, setbacks, 
and breakthroughs as part of the process. The breaks in the process can be necessary for the parties 
to take time for the parties to consult and reflect on the process. Nevertheless in the case of violent 
crisis there is the moral and political urgency towards the parties to make responsible decisions. 
Time thus has to be managed wisely at the same time remaining patient. Additionally Giro notes 
that hasty agreements rarely are good ones but rather fragile. Hence the parties in conflict can 
exploit the fragility of the rushed agreement. The time has to be taken also to listen and wait for the 
right moment when it is possible to engage genuinely with the conflicting parties. (Giro 2012. 99) 
Giro also notes that the conception of time can be different between the international community 
and the parties involved in war. (Ibid. 100) 
4.1.5. Reconciliation processes 
Similarly to the theory of Appleby (1998. 43) Sant’Egidio is evolving practices to allow 
reconciliation. The process of reconciliation unfolds deep within the society and the work towards 
reconciliation materializes gradually. (Giro 2012. 105) The Community of Sant’Egidio has 
experienced that it is essential to focus prolonged attention and ongoing presence in synergy with 
other actors to make the most for contributing to a positive outcome. (105) (Giro 2012) In an 
interview with the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs (2008) Giro also mentions 
synergy with official work as a particular characteristic of Sant’Egidio. This is enabled by their 
flexibility and ability to work in a highly tailor made way (Ibid.). Translating the mediation process 
into workable proposals one must have political practice and understanding the power relations in 
the conflict. In this regard Sant’Egidio can cooperate with other actors with the respective expertise 
needed. For example in the beginning when including parties to the peace process the mediators can 
cooperate to allow the crucial voices to be heard. (Giro 2012. 104-105) Thus their approach to 
mediation is to focus on reconciliation and as their work relies on connections with other actors 
emphasizes the need for work in synergy. 
The mediation process by the Community of Sant’Egidio is not only dedicated to reaching a 




as mentioned by Giro (2012. 102) as well as Riccardi (2010. 14). Learning to accept the different 
opinions of the people living in the same society represents the training for the former combatants 
to share power and live in coexistence with each other. (Giro 2012. 105) In a way also their 
approach to mediation enables on their part that the foundations are laid for reconciliation already in 
the mediation process nevertheless the parties themselves are responsible for reconciliation and the 
outside actors can only support this endeavor.  
4.1.6. Interest in disinterest 
According to Anouilh every social space or certain field has its own kind of material and symbolic 
forms of interests. Within a field there can be separate logics about the material and symbolic 
goods. Referring to Bourdieu’s logic of economy of symbolic goods and economy of material 
goods, something symbolically beneficial can be economically costly or irrational. Furthermore 
there can be symbolic interest in being economically disinterested. (Anouilh 2011. 105) Anouilh 
argues referring to Bourdieu (1990) that religion as a social universe enables the possibility to have 
disinterest in material interests. Thus for religion it is particular to have interest in disinterest. 
(Anouilh 2011. 106)  
Mediation by Sant’Egidio is a disinterest act since they are not paid for their mediation work and 
they are not after personal gain connected to their mediation. They acknowledge that every 
agreement has its difficulties thus it is normal that it can also fail and should not be feared since you 
can always start over. This is related to the theory presented by Silvestri and Mayall (2015. 10) that 
highlights the importance of the transformative and gradual dimension of processes leading towards 
peace and thus it is realistic that the mediation process involves stages of negative and positive 
peace. The conflicting parties should take time to reflect on the setbacks in the mediation process 
and thus take responsibility for their actions towards the peace agreement. They cannot blame the 
mediator for the failure. (Giro 2012. 103) In the case if the parties try to use these blackmailing 
tactics for a favorable result or to undermine the impartiality of the process, the Community of 
Sant’Egidio has significant leverage since they are not paid for the mediation and thus are not 
having anything at stake in this sense. They are not open to this kind of intimidation. Giro (2012. 
104) describes it as respect through ethical force that they can use as a form of pressure. (Ibid. 104) 
4.1.7. Religious dedication and financial resources 
The founders of Sant’Egidio have a fair amount of social and cultural capital since they, both the 
laymen as well as the priests, come from wealthy families and are also highly educated. Thus they 
share the same socio-cultural background. (Anouilh 2011. 107) All the founders are highly educated 




They have the symbolic capital of scholars as well as the symbolic capital of religious agents. 
Anouilh defines knowledge, rationality, and expertise as part of the symbolic capital of scholars and 
as symbolic capital of religious agents he describes righteousness and dedication. Therefore the 
religious activity and the high social positions come together as this specific sociological feature of 
the founders of Sant’Egidio. The economic reliability allows the founders to be free from economic 
contingencies. (Anouilh 2011. 108) 
Religious dedication is noted also by Appleby (1998. 42) who states that having a critical and 
positive role in the world entails that religious actors remain religious. Furthermore the combination 
of religious and academic spheres characterizes the founding members of the Community of 
Sant’Egidio. With this social legitimacy and religious dedication they were able to extend their 
prerogatives through mixing both religious probity in other words being honest and decent through 
having strong moral principles, and academic knowledge, in other words rationality. Symbolic 
capital was gained from the received prizes by Sant’Egidio and its members as well as sales of the 
books they have written. The sources of material capital of Sant’Egidio are quests and donations. 
Anouilh notes that it is difficult to find documents on the finances of Sant’Egidio and in addition 
the leaders are vague on the issue or remain silent about money. (Anouilh 2011. 110) 
According to Anouilh economic wealth is symbolically expensive for Sant’Egidio because it is in 
contradiction to its image of religious dedication. Sant’Egidio cannot show its wealth without 
having an effect to the value of its symbolic capital. They attracted financial support and rewards 
after their effective mediation efforts but it is a peculiar paradox of Sant’Egidio that they must hide 
their economic capital. According to Anouilh the estimated annual budget of Sant’Egidio is 
approximately 2.5 million euros. Two thirds of this amount goes to charity work and one third goes 
to inter-religious meetings and peacemaking. Additionally logistical support is offered by Fiat and 
Mercedes, and famous Roman hotels offer their rooms for free for the use of Sant’Egidio. Anouilh 
notes that the religious and non-economic aspects attract companies to provide them with material 
goods since they will be remunerated in a symbolic way. This symbolic legitimacy is a useful asset 
for Sant’Egidio and they are aware of it to use it for achieving their goals. In the words of Anouilh 
symbolic capital gives symbolic power. (Anouilh 2011. 111) The symbolic power can be seen as a 
part of credibility leverage thus they can have influence through this intangible resource of 
symbolic power that comes from social legitimacy and religious dedication that is characteristic for 
them. Thus it is important not to secularize their work completely in order to keep the leverage 




4.1.8. Historical ties 
The Community of Sant’Egidio through personal networks creates historical ties to people with 
various backgrounds. They have personal relationships and history together not only with people on 
the grassroots level but with religious actors, combatants, and political leaders. Furthermore 
Riccardi notes that the personal networks are constantly consciously nurtured by the Community of 
Sant’Egidio. (Riccardi 2010. 10) Thus they see the value of their networks as an important aspect 
enabling them to be involved and conduct mediation. Historical connections with the peace 
processes are mentioned in the theory of Reid (2015) as one source of credibility leverage. The 
Community of Sant’Egidio also notes that the intimate knowledge of the parties is an advantage.  
Giro describes continuity of the individuals as mediators as a difference that is its advantage in 
comparison with institutional mediators who change more frequently in their positions. Having 
constantly the same individuals in the mediation process enables them to forge stable relationships 
with the actors in the peace process. The network of personal ties is very important for the 
Community of Sant’Egidio to be able to offer its mediation and for its mediation to be asked for. 
The network of personal ties stems from the steady presence on the ground in the conflict area. 
(Giro 2012. 98) The expansion of the network thus naturally extended over the years through 
testimonials of others and supported the capacity of the Community of Sant’Egidio to reach key 
players in the field. (Ibid. 99) 
Networks and connections that Sant’Egidio creates can be also connected to the theory about the 
tracks of diplomacy. They show in practice how the different tracks are connected through this 
cooperation with actors from their own tracks like track 7 as well as the track 1 and others. 
Sant’Egidio does not only connect with bishops, missionaries, and their own communities in 
conflict affected countries (Bartoli 2012. 111) but Riccardi (2010. 10) notes that they have had 
close relations with American diplomats, and French diplomats as well as other European countries’ 
diplomats. Embracing hopes and dreams for peace Sant’Egidio can reach out for expertise and 
capacity to intervene from network of contacts (Ibid.). The connectivity and holism described in 
theory by Grad (2014. 66) similarly can be detected in their approach to mediation. 
Referring to Bourdieu Anouilh notes that long-lasting virtuous behavior cannot last with a free will 
commitment but a social network and environment favorable to it is necessary. In other words the 
founders of Sant’Egidio are able to materialize their belief in practice since it is enabled by their 
personal socio-cultural capital, and status in the society that could be described as to be part of elite. 




individual can be a specific form of social resource. The creation of potentially useful social 
relations can be conscious or unconscious. (Giro 2012. 98) In the case of Sant’Egidio it is a 
conscious effort to create this form of social capital that they can gain credibility leverage from. 
Nevertheless they can also through this get involved with capability leverage such as donations for 
example. Also Anouilh notes that Sant’Egidio expands strategically its network. In an interview 
Mario Giro explains to Anouilh that through the activities with the poor and the promotion of their 
activities Sant’Egidio naturally evolves relationships with people locally and internationally. 
Furthermore they get in touch with officials, diplomats, and civil servants and keep in touch with 
them later when they might get transferred to other position in state department or embassy for 
example. (Anouilh 2011. 108) The founding members have very effective social networking skills. 
Anouilh connects the dedication to the poor and the charity work of Sant’Egidio as one form of its 
symbolic capital that is in fact based on this religious form of dedication. The dedication is possible 
because they are priests or otherwise in a social position that is consistent with their commitment 
and they have a wealthy background that is in favor of high-potential networking that helps to 
implement the symbolic capital of Sant’Egidio. (Ibid. 109) 
4.1.9. Humane aspects the focus instead of technicalities 
The Community of Sant’Egidio views it as a human decision to start a war and that decision can be 
changed or avoided. They focus on the hearts and motives of the ones who have made the decision 
to begin and continue war. According to Giro agreements about sharing power and wealth are not 
enough but holistic approach to healing is required. There can be genuine reasons for the parties to 
fear an agreement thus the technicalities of the agreement cannot be the focus if the mediation aims 
to be effective. (Giro 2012.103) This can be also related to the theory on transformative mediation 
thus Sant’Egidio wants to transform the parties in the conflict and only secondary focus is on the 
technicalities of a peace agreement. In their focus can be seen also their strength that they do not 
take part in something like wealth and power sharing if they do not have the capability leverage to 
do it and rather leave it to the other tracks of diplomacy. 
According to Giro (2012. 105) the mediation team has to have imagination and creativity which is 
needed in the facilitative and formulative strategies of mediation. As having credibility leverage 
their insightful knowledge on the peace process can be of advantage in order to find the right way to 
engage the civil society and to give them a voice and space in the political transitions. 
One of the main guidelines in the mediation approach by the Community of Sant’Egidio is to give 




mediation process. As said by Bartoli (2001) previously also Giro explains that the most vulnerable 
to the changes and transformation in the society are the poor. Giro also argues that peace is much 
more than agreements instead it is about rebuilding social fabric, fostering inclusion, bringing 
together different generations in other words peace is about building a shared existence. This view 
to mediation can be also connected to the theory on transformative mediation. Same idea is shared 
by the Bishop of Helsinki, Irja Askola (Junkkari 2016) that even in a peaceful society it is important 
to pay attention that if we do not have any common code for understanding each other, it is 
dangerous for the feeling of belonging to the community. Even if this kind of thinking and ideas 
come from a person who is part of a religious community, it is appealing to people for the humane 
aspect it involves making sense to common people as well. According to Giro the commitment to 
fellow human beings is a moral strength that is needed in the world. (Giro 2012. 94) 
The mediation process can be a chance for the conflicting parties to say everything they have on 
their hearts rediscovering the value of dialogue and words. (Giro 2012. 100) The human element is 
important for the mediation approach of Sant’Egidio and thus the mediation process starts with a 
dialogue between the conflicting parties that leads to drafting a written draft. It can be a dreadful 
step for the parties to put their commitments on a paper since it shows clearly their responsibilities. 
Sant’Egidio especially refuses to go straight to writing the agreement and even worse is if the 
agreement is ready made without consulting the conflicting parties first. In this kind of situation a 
mediator can be seen more like as a judge than a mediator. Giro accuses that currently there is a 
phenomenon of focusing on the technicalities which can lead to the mediator to seem distant to the 
parties as well as taking the matters out of the context. According to Giro tuning into the conflict is 
crucial for the mediator in order to understand the perceptions of the parties as well as the reality 
they live in. If mediator is attentive to the victims and the society as a whole they can find solutions 
to the conflict even before talking to the combatants. (Ibid.) 
Coming back to one of the fundamental parts of the Community of Sant’Egidio their work with the 
poor in the society it is also a stepping point for their approach to mediation. This is because 
according to Giro (2012. 101) among the poor can be found goodwill and understanding that stems 
from common sense. Because the poor are not able to escape the suffering of the war so easily Giro 
argues that they preserve the desire for peace and aspiration for future. When they have heard the 
concerns of the general populace they turn to the combatants and the key players. According to Giro 
hearing about the motivations of the conflicting parties is important to understand the root causes of 




human aspect of mediating a conflict, in which real people are involved and they have their 





5. THREE EMPIRICAL CASE STUDIES ON THE MEDIATION BY 
THE COMMUNITY OF SANT’EGIDIO 
Following from the structure of the research questions in this chapter the focus is on the second 
research question, which is: What particular resources can they draw on when they conduct 
mediation, and what are the main challenges following from their approach? Therefore the 
mediation efforts by Sant’Egidio are presented in the context of peace processes in Mozambique, 
Liberia, and Casamance. The first case of mediation is Mozambique that was the first time that the 
community of Sant’Egidio took part in mediation in the beginning of 1990s. The second case 
chosen here is about mediation by Sant’Egidio in the conflict in Liberia from the beginning of 
2000s. The third case where Sant’Egidio has been mediating is in the Casamance region of Senegal 
from 2012 until 2014. The main points from the cases are analyzed and further discussed together in 
a separate chapter about the particular resources and challenges of the Community of Sant’Egidio. 
5.1. Mozambique 
Sant’Egidio was mediating between the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), which 
represented the state and Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), which was a rebel 
movement trying to gain power through civil war. There were 11 negotiation sessions during 27 
months and thus Sant’Egidio came to understand that they are not able to impose peace but it had to 
be built. Simultaneously Sant’Egidio kept in contact with interested states’ diplomatic communities 
that were involved to arbitrate over the implementation process. Consequently this led to the mixing 
of different tracks of diplomacy that was new at the time. Sant’Egidio saw their experience in 
Mozambique as a revelation to be able to solve complex conflicts. (Giro 2012. 96) Before the 
peacemaking and diplomacy in Mozambique Sant’Egidio was developing a missionary ethos. 
Afterwards various local communities have emerged in the African continent. Thus there is much 
historical weight on the mediation experience in Mozambique since it was successful their 
legitimacy increased (Anouilh 2011. 109). (Giro 2012. 94) 
5.1.1. Humanitarian aid and development of connections before the mediation process 
Sant’Egidio had its first Mozambican contacts in 1977 with the newly appointed Bishop of Beira, 
Jaime Gonçalves. The climate in recently independent Mozambique was oppressive towards the 
religious community and Catholicism because of the Marxist-Leninist government. Because of this 
Sant’Egidio assisted in arranging meetings between the Bishop of Beira and the Italian Communist 




the PCI at the Community of Sant’Egidio. The beneficial consequences were only discovered years 
later. (Gianturco 2010. 32-33) 
In 1983 there was a severe drought in Mozambique and Sant’Egidio responded to the appeal for 
famine victims by Bishop Gonçalves with initiatives of humanitarian aid. In August 1984 Matteo 
Zuppi and Andrea Riccardi went to Mozambique coincidentally at the same time when planeloads 
of humanitarian aid arrived. This helped Sant’Egidio to create connections with the civil authorities. 
(Gianturco 2010. 33) as well as understanding better the situation in Mozambique. (Gianturco 2010. 
34) Similarly to the theory by Garrigues (2015. 5) on NGO mediators they were able to get involved 
to the peace process on the initial stages through first providing humanitarian aid. 
Riccardi and Zuppi established personal relationship with the leaders of FRELIMO. In the spirit of 
selfless friendship they had open dialogue about initiatives on development cooperation and cultural 
exchange. This interaction fostered flexibility among the ideologically rigid ideological thought of 
FRELIMO. The normalization of the state of Mozambique and the Catholic Church really started 
from the meeting arranged by Sant’Egidio between the Mozambican president and the Pope John 
Paul II in 1985. (Gianturco 2010. 34) Ships of solidarity were sent to Mozambique from the 
initiative of Sant’Egidio 1986 and 1988. The humanitarian aid was distributed by Sant’Egidio 
volunteers, missionaries, and Caritas Mozambique. Since the aid did not reach all parts of the 
country in order to get help to everyone and have real development Sant’Egidio took direct interest 
to the ways of resolving the conflict in Mozambique. (Ibid. 35) 
Sant’Egidio wanted to establish direct contact with the rebel movement RENAMO since it would 
enable better understanding of how the crisis could be solved. The overseas wing of RENAMO in 
the US had internal divisions so seeking contact with them was dismissed. 1987 in the summer 
Zuppi was introduced to a possible contact person within RENAMO Artur Da Fonseca who was the 
Secretary for External Relations based in West Germany. The credibility of Da Fonseca was tested 
through a request to free a Portuguese nun kidnapped by RENAMO. End of April 1988 the nun was 
freed and so they were on the right track. In May 1988 a secret meeting was arranged by 
Sant’Egidio between the Archbishop Gonçalves and RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama in a 
cordial atmoshophere the parties were satisfied with the meeting and the leader of RENAMO 
showed initial interest in peace talks. (Gianturco 2010. 35-36) 
In September 1988 through the cooperation of the Mozambican President Chissano with the 
Catholic bishops a meeting was held where the Pope was urging settlement indirectly recalling the 




(Ibid. 36-37) This was the culmination of the work of Sant’Egidio to improve the relations between 
the church and the state in Mozambique. (Ibid. 37) This can be connected to the theory of indirect 
relations by Böhmelt (2009) that they had first indirect connections with the country but they were 
able to later get direct contact with the parties. 
Andrea Riccardi was officially invited to the fifth Congress of FRELIMO in August 1989. Riccardi 
had a speech reiterating and reaffirming the support of Sant’Egidio for the capability of the 
government to achieve peace. Thunderous applauds from the delegates displayed the desire for 
peace. Talking about peace was a new approach since before there had been only talk about 
granting amnesty to the rebels. (Gianturco 2010. 37) 
Even if the regional initiatives due to their own partial interests had failed it was a sign that things 
were beginning to happen. Nevertheless it was obvious that mutual trust between the parties was 
lacking. In February 1990 Sant’Egidio invited the leader of RENAMO for his first visit to Rome 
where need for dialogue was discussed. The secret meeting of the future mediators was the first step 
for gaining the trust of the rebel movement as well as necessary if RENAMO was going to take the 
risky leap of faith to join negotiations. (Gianturco 2010. 38) 
Diplomatic efforts by major powers had failed so far to create real communication between the 
warring parties. Yet the involvement of Italy in the mediation was an advantage because of its 
strong presence in Mozambique and cooperation through the PCI. However Italy could be seen as 
partial because of being friendly with the FRELIMO government. There were further contacts with 
RENAMO after the February visit and both parties started to be ready to have direct talks. 
(Gianturco 2010. 38) 
5.1.2. Requests for faith-based mediation 
Two nearly simultaneous requests for mediation were received by Sant’Egidio. In March 1990 
President Chissano declared to be open for negotiations through the Labor Minister, but not on 
behalf of FRELIMO as a whole, who requested a secret meeting. At the same time the External 
Relations Secretary of RENAMO officially requested mediation from Sant’Egidio. Negotiations got 
on the way 8 July 1990 in a tense yet hopeful atmosphere. In his speech to the respective 
delegations Andrea Riccardi talked about “the great Mozambican family”, in which the working 
method of the talks relied on reminding about things that unite the two conflicting parties rather 
than things that divide them. (Gianturco 2010. 39) Riccardi noted that it is more difficult to pass the 
difficulties between brothers than strangers. Furthermore he continued that brothers stay brothers 




first round of the talks was conducted behind closed doors notwithstanding it led to the signing of a 
public Joint Communiqué. (Ibid. 40) 
There were four observers who later served as mediators. They were Riccardi and Zuppi from 
Sant’Egidio, Mario Raffaelli as a representative of the Italian government, and Gonçalves, the 
Archbishop of Beira. The invaluable source of the mediators was that they worked entirely pro-
bono. They worked as a complementary team to official diplomacy and were better able to see the 
complexities of the conflict disconnected from the international dynamics. The RENAMO 
delegation was headed by Raul Domingos earnest and determined person who during the talks 
transformed from a guerilla to a diplomat and politician. One of the highest ranking Mozambican 
officials as well as a skillful politician and a talented speaker Armando Guebuza was head of the 
FRELIMO delegation. The four observers between them the delegates from the parties in conflict 
sat on the opposite sides of tables that were in a horse shoe formation. (Gianturco 2010. 40-41) As 
stated as the goal of transformative mediation in the theory chapter this example shows how 
Sant’Egidio was able to transform the leaders of the conflicting parties from rebels to political 
leaders. 
At the time it was a topic for controversy that the Roman mediation team was not representing a 
state or an international institution. Nevertheless Gianturco describes it as a group of people of good 
will and had greater freedom to act lending it different kind of credibility thus it was trusted because 
it did not pursue its own political or economic agenda. The negotiations produced a Joint 
Communiqué that was interpreted by the people of Mozambique as a peace agreement. (Gianturco 
2010. 41) Nevertheless this was just the beginning of the mediation process and the parties had still 
conflicting agendas and RENAMO was not willing to grant ceasefire because it saw armed struggle 
as the only way to assert its claims. (Ibid. 42) 
5.1.3. Mediation style in Mozambique 
Since the parties had been in conflict for 14 years by the time that Sant’Egidio started mediation 
between them the convivial encounters were only few during the mediation process. Informal 
meetings of the parties were always accompanied by the mediators and were not pressured to have 
any unnecessary encounters. Gianturco notes that the parties felt more secure to negotiate when the 
setting was formal and confidential and no press was allowed. Only in the final months of the 
mediation there were press releases given about the progress (Gianturco 2010. 43). The 
communication between the parties was indirect via shuttle diplomacy by the mediators. Gianturco 




Consequently there were no forced expressions of familiarity between the conflicting parties. 
Contrariwise the encounters between the delegations of FRELIMO and RENAMO were minimal 
just a handshake between the parties in the beginning of entering the negotiation room that became 
a tradition. The mediators sought to establish a common language and mutual respect between the 
delegations but no false friendship was fostered. Informalities would have been unwarranted and 
insincere regarding the caused tribulation by the parties to the people of Mozambique. (Gianturco 
2010. 42) 
The building mutual trust was not possible to rush before there was substantial progress on solving 
the issues between the parties. The clear rules of formality with the dynamic of respectful meetings 
without pleasantries between “compatriots” proved successful. Gianturco refers to the observer of 
the mediation Cameron Hume who states that the Mozambican peace talks extraordinarily 
combined expertise from the fields of psychology and history as well as legal and political culture. 
Hume also acknowledged the dedication of the mediators and the people of Sant’Egidio who were 
ironing out tensions and differences. (Gianturco 2010. 43) 
It was necessary to put the delegations at ease. Not only the founding members of Sant’Egidio were 
involved in the mediation process but also other members of Sant’Egidio voluntarily and unpaid 
were enabling the negotiations to run smoothly paying attention to every detail for the ultimate goal 
of peace. Referring to Boutros Boutros-Ghali Gianturco writes that Sant’Egidio developed their 
own technique of mediation different from but complementary to the states and institutions’ 
mediation. (Gianturco 2010. 44) 
Sometimes the church was used as the meeting place where there were prayers for peace. According 
to Gianturco the religious inspiration was strong and pervaded the mediation efforts but was not 
coerced. The religious spirit without denominational connotations was conveyed to the delegations 
of the parties in conflict. Gianturco refers to the mediators of the Mozambican conflict who 
emphasized that the peace had been formed through the “weak strength of faith”. The mediators 
grasped the conflict on a political and human level. (Gianturco 2010. 45) 
They only had the money necessary to facilitate the mediation efforts through donations but not 
fund for imposing peace in a form of military or economic resources. Nevertheless they had the 
capability leverage in the sense of Reid (2015) that they were able to fund the process even though 
they did not use it for persuasion. They did not impose deadlines and the documents were prepared 
on the parties’ own wordings. (Gianturco 2010. 45) The mediators were mediating between the 




text. Time and thought were given to details. The peace was possible because the parties were 
willing to reconsider their positions on the issues at stake. It was an anthropological transformation 
of the members of the delegations that took place. This way of putting together the agreement 
reassured that it belonged to the parties who were convinced of the settlement. (Gianturco 2010. 46) 
In the case of Mozambique there was no other solution to the conflict than to move it from the 
battle field to political sphere because military victory was unlikely to restore peace. It also showed 
that it is possible to get one’s position across through dialogue and political disputation. (Gianturco 
2010. 46) 
5.1.4. Time to reflect for the parties 
The time taken for the mediation process enabled the evolution of the parties’ mentality and culture. 
There was a necessary period of acclimatization before the first of the protocols was signed after 15 
months of talks. On the one hand RENAMO needed to advance its guerilla psychology that had 
developed in the course of the war and international isolation. On the other hand the rigid 
association that only FRELIMO was the representative of the state had to change. The parties put 
behind their mental and political reluctance and accepted the mutual right of each party to exist 
stated in extra agenda document. The mediators encouraged RENAMO to transform into a political 
movement. (Gianturco 2010. 47) The contributing factor in the case of Mozambique was that the 
rebel movement was strongly unified in its leadership. Nevertheless the change in the mindsets of 
the conflicting parties was slow. Because of the ancestral fears and mistrust the core of FRELIMO 
not part of the delegation was unconvinced of RENAMO as a legitimate dialogue partner but only 
saw it as a puppet of South Africa and the international reactionary forces. (Gianturco 2010. 48) 
It was a challenge to bring together the parties that came from different worlds with their own logic 
and dynamics. Majority of the documents signed by the parties emerged after the Protocol for Basic 
Principles was signed, which clarified their mutual identity bridging together the different 
approaches and ways of thinking. (Gianturco 2010. 48-49) 
Paradoxically the peace process was slowed down by the unilateral adoption of multiparty system 
by FRELIMO 31 July 1990 because this was viewed as delegitimizing the demands for changes of 
RENAMO that it had been fighting for years. From the problem solving mediation approach the 
adoption of multiparty system could be seen as a success nevertheless it was not. This supports the 
view of transformative mediation and seeing further than the technicalities. Different views on what 
is wasting time and what is required for mutual acceptance were shown for example in the media 




example shows how the transformative approach of Sant’Egidio was not as valued by the outsiders. 
Other than time Gianturco describes the base for stable peace in the context of the mediation in 
Mozambique that was built on the elements of “memory, friendship, selflessness, care, sensitivity, 
willingness to understand, a love of history and complexity”, and determined support for peace 
(Ibid. 50). These are aspects that come from the unique moral and spiritual leverage as Bercovitch 
and Kadayifci-Orellana (2009. 199) describe and is a resource for the approach of mediation by 
Sant’Egidio. 
Qualms by RENAMO had postponed the deadline but the peace agreement was finally signed by 
the parties in October in 1992 after finishing touches were made concerning military questions and 
cessation of hostilities. The agreement included guarantees for implementation. There was strong 
confidence towards the future and tensions had dissolved through solving misunderstandings 
between the parties. (Gianturco 2010. 51- 53) As argued by Grad (2014) about faith-based actors 
taking part throughout the peace process this example demonstrates how Sant’Egidio was involved 
in the different stages of the peace process related to its mediation efforts. 
5.1.5. Summary of the mediation in Mozambique 
The first connections in Mozambique were established through religion, and then widened through 
distribution of humanitarian aid. In Mozambique Sant’Egidio naturally evolved connections to the 
parties in conflict although first contacts were with FRELIMO and only later through indirect 
connections they were able to have direct connection with RENAMO. In Mozambique Sant’Egidio 
was part of the official mediation team. In this case religious aspects were particularly present 
shaping the mediation approach. Particular resources came from the historical connections and 
information on the ground as the theory of credibility leverage by Reid (2015) suggests and 
connections to economically and materially leveraged actors enabled them to fund the process and 
maintain presence lending them the capability leverage similarly to the theory of Reid (2015). 
5.2. Liberia 
Before the actual mediation in 2003 the Community of the Sant’Egidio was already in contact with 
the rebel group in 2002 and only after in 2003 they indirectly got the President of Liberia interested 
in negotiation as an option for pursuing military victory. Sant’Egidio mainly had connections to the 
rebel group called the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) in the mediation 
process. The Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS) was officially 
mediating from 1990 until 2003 about the political power sharing (Fisas 2015b. 3) between the state 




5.2.1. Background of the peace process 
Sekou Damate Conneh, the leader of LURD founded the movement in 1999, which consisted of the 
enemies of the President Charles Taylor. (Scelzo 2010. 227-228) Conneh visited Sant’Egidio in 
Rome at the critical point when the official negotiations had reached a dead end. Unexpectedly on 4 
August in the headquarters of Sant’Egidio Conneh signed a declaration that was published at a press 
conference. Conneh joined discussions with his delegation for a week in Rome and after that he 
publicly declared that he would sign the peace agreement. In addition Conneh gave an order to his 
troops to observe a unilateral ceasefire and withdraw from the capital city’s outskirts. According to 
Scelzo the desirable and productive cooperation between different methods of the diverse tracks of 
diplomacy was shown in the peace process in Liberia. (Scelzo 2010. 227-228) 
The mediation by the Sant’Egidio was conducted in collaboration with the government of Ghana 
and ECOWAS. Sant’Egidio was represented in the mediation by Mario Giro and Angelo Romano 
who attended the negotiations as observers from the beginning. Later on they became facilitators 
because they had established relations with the LURD rebel group, and thus were able to assist 
when the negotiations were in trouble. Nevertheless by the end of July Sant’Egidio became aware 
that division between the LURD delegation taking part in the negotiations and the military 
commanders of LURD on the ground and particularly Conneh had emerged. (Scelzo 2010. 228) 
Discussion conducted in the headquarters of Sant’Egidio prevented the split opening a way for the 
peace agreement. (Scelzo 2010. 229) 
5.2.2. 2002 – First connections with LURD 
Fabio Riccardi from Sant’Egidio was the first one to meet with LURD in Guinea-Conakry in July 
2002 establishing the relationship between Sant’Egidio and LURD. In the discussions the 
spokesman for LURD William Nhinson agreed to send delegation to Rome. In September the same 
year various members of LURD visited Rome twice. Among them were Nhison and Francis 
Nyepon from LURD with whom the representatives of Sant’Egidio made arrangements for further 
meetings. (Scelzo 2010. 234) 
Visit to Sant’Egidio in Rome by a larger LURD delegation was arranged by Fabio Riccardi, 
Claudio Betti, Angelo Romano, and Mario Giro and it took place 1 December 2002. Eight officials 
of LURD from Guinea-Conakry, Ivory Coast, Europe, and the US took part of the meeting at 
Sant’Egidio headquarters. The meeting clarified especially the aspects regarding the nature of the 
movement, agenda as well as its relation to Charles Taylor’s government. The conclusion was that 




What kept LURD together was their common hatred towards Taylor. Despite of being younger than 
other prominent members and not so charismatic Conneh was accepted as the leader of the 
movement because he had connections to the President of Conakry-Guinea, Lansana Conté. 
Furthermore by the end of 2002 the political agenda of LURD was uncertain and undecided 
whether it would still pursuit the military option or as recommended the negotiations. (Scelzo 2010. 
235) 
Military offensives had been ongoing and surrounded Monrovia but the capital had not given in. In 
Rome the peaceful resolution of the conflict and possible ways of mediation were discussed in the 
meetings in the end of the year. (Scelzo 2010. 235) 
5.2.3. 2003 – Request for a neutral mediator in the official peace talks 
Mario Giro and Fabio Riccardi had the chance to get in touch with a representative of the Liberian 
president Charles Taylor 15 January 2003 in the opening ceremony of the Marcoussis talks on Ivory 
Coast. Even though Taylor was convinced of the military victory, through his close female aide, 
Riccardi and Giro were able to get him interested in a private channel of communication with 
LURD. (Scelzo 2010. 235) In this example Sant’Egidio acted as an indirect link between the parties 
that according to Böhmelt (2009) create more possibilities for later direct contacts. This also shows 
how through being active in other peace processes they could create personal connections possibly 
useful in the future and increasing their potential to be a mediator. This is also seen as one source of 
credibility leverage by Reid (2015. 8). 
The contact became more sporadic between Sant’Egidio and LURD in early 2003 because of the 
inner disagreements of the rebel group on the matter of which strategy to follow. The LURD 
delegation that had visited Rome was accused by the leaders of the movement of independent 
agenda and underlying interests for changes in the leadership. (Scelzo 2010. 235) 
Due to the worsening humanitarian crisis in the beginning of the year ECOWAS suggested meeting 
of the parties to discuss about possible negotiated way out of the conflict. Originally the talks were 
planned to take place in April and May in Mali. Nevertheless ECOWAS lacking the necessary 
contacts the initiative failed. From January to April LURD experienced tense relations among its 
members. Rumors told that Conneh might be ousted from his position as the leader of the 
movement. Any talks could not be convened because of this. Additionally Mali was not willing to 
host the negotiations anymore. Nevertheless the dispute over the leadership was solved and Conneh 




ECOWAS proposed that the talks would be arranged in the capital of Ghana 15 April 2003. LURD 
refused and so the talks were postponed. Subsequently Conneh sought consultation from 
Sant’Egidio directly. Sant’Egidio and ECOWAS established a close liaison primarily through the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ghana in order to coordinate potential initiatives. 19 May Conneh 
had not yet decided whether to participate to the talks or not. Through Nhinson Conneh wished to 
come to Rome with a LURD delegation before the official talks started. In an email sent by 
Nhinson, Conneh requested also that Sant’Egidio would be attending the official talks since it was 
seen as a trustworthy party for its neutrality. (Scelzo 2010. 236) The rebel leaders requested 
Sant’Egidio to attend the official talks so the mediation was requested not offered. 
The visit to Rome 10 May by a delegation from ECOWAS revealed that the regional countries had 
not established effective channel of communication with the leadership of LURD. Furthermore 
Conneh did not trust ECOWAS and was thus for the military solution. At this point Taylor’s groups 
were concentrated in the city center of Monrovia but Conneh saw still a possibility to succeed. 
Moreover the political demand of LURD had clarified as the expulsion of Taylor. They did not 
want to share power with him. Nonetheless they were willing to include his political party in the 
possible dialogue. Conneh gave in under pressure from all sides even from his supporters in 
Conakry. (Scelzo 2010. 236) 
Conneh had agreed to send a delegation to the official talks but it seemed more like a polite gesture 
to the international community since he was still focused to capture the capital city. At the same 
time the future talks in Accra had rescheduled to 4 June 2003. Suddenly the same day an 
international arrest warrant was issued against Taylor. On one hand the arrest warrant of Taylor was 
jubilated by LURD but on the other hand the indictment weakened the prospects for the option of 
negotiated settlement. Conneh thought of recalling his delegation since in his view it was very 
likely that the game was over for Taylor. Others were worried that Taylor would now be motivated 
to continue fighting to the last man. (Scelzo 2010. 237) 
The official mediator in the talks was former Nigerian President General Abubakar who was 
assisted by officials from ECOWAS and ministry of foreign affairs of Ghana. The primary 
objective of the talks was to secure a ceasefire to ease tensions in the sieged Monrovia. Secondly 
the aim was to enable discussions on possible transitional government. (Scelzo 2010. 237) 
Conneh arrived in Rome 3 June 2003 with Nhinson the spokesperson of LURD for the meeting 
with Sant’Egidio. This was the first time he agreed to meet representatives of the international 




certainty of Conneh about the movement’s military victory was hindering the talks. His interest was 
only to remove Taylor from power and was bitter that his arrest had failed. Conneh told that the 
Americans were pressuring him to sign a ceasefire agreement. During Conneh’s visit in Rome there 
was news that the troops of LURD were getting closer to the presidential palace. Consequently 
Conneh was about to join his troops in Liberia because he was still convinced of his right to be the 
leader of the country and the transitional government after leading successfully the struggle for 
freedom. The international community opposed this. Conneh was concerned that the goal of the 
official peace talks was to force the parties to accept a ceasefire agreement and that the decisions 
about the future of Liberia were made by outsiders. (Ibid. 238) Thus Sant’Egidio was able to give 
the parties a sense of ownership of the future and dissolve the feelings of pressure and bitterness 
through their own kind of approach. 
Sant’Egidio was able to soften Conneh’s stance gradually underlining the difficulties that would be 
involved in securing a rapid military victory. Guiding Conneh’s attention towards the delicate 
balance between the fractions in LURD as well as recognition from the international community 
Sant’Egidio tried to persuade the rebel leader to take part in the official talks. The discussions were 
long and exacting because Conneh knew that LURD was divided and realized that the US, the 
regional countries and other countries with interests in the outcome of the crisis would not accept 
that the conflict would end in the rebel movement’s favor. (Ibid. 238) This was due to the history of 
letting Taylor be chosen for the president with unfair elections, and so the international community 
was hesitant to give power to the armed factions again. Thus Conneh did not have a great chance of 
finding allies to back him up as the future leader of the country. The international community 
insisted on a political approach because they did not want to reward the rebels for fighting. (Ibid. 
239) 
After the long discussions Conneh finally was persuaded to ease the humanly intolerable siege of 
Monrovia for humanitarian reasons. Conneh also announced a unilateral ceasefire and recognized 
the official talks that were in progress in Accra. The fighting around Monrovia halted for a few 
weeks and Sant’Egidio had been able to persuade Conneh to seriously consider the political option. 
Conneh appreciated that Sant’Egidio was impartial and thus saw it as a credible mediator. The 
foundations were thus laid for the official talks to continue. The LURD troops retreated from the 
surroundings of the city center, and the LURD delegation agreed to sign the ceasefire agreement for 




Despite the tensions between the parties the mediation process was able to be continued. In the 
middle of June there were major disagreements between the LURD military leaders on the ground 
and the LURD delegation taking part in the official negotiations about eligibility to take the highest 
offices in the transitional government. The international community pressured the mediation team 
to disqualify the parties involved with fighting in the civil war and proposed that the leader should 
be impartial figure from the civil society. Furthermore it was suggested that the places in the 
transitional government would be divided between the three political views. The LURD delegation 
was open to discuss the proposed plan but Conneh was against it. (Scelzo 2010. 240) 
19 June some days after the truce Conneh recommenced the siege of Monrovia thus disavowing the 
position of LURD delegation in the peace talks. The LURD delegation was engaged in the peace 
talks contrariwise to the wary and distant military leadership of LURD. The leadership of LURD 
was to be tackled carefully by the mediation team taking to count Conneh’s ambitions in order to 
carry on. Sant’Egidio advised the mediation team to get Conneh to join the talks in Accra but 
irritated Conneh was not willing to give up his demand for a high position in the transitional 
government and even threatened to withdraw LURD delegation from the talks. The rejection of the 
demand was inevitable because all the other parties involved including the Liberian people wanted 
to make a fresh start and have an impartial leader for the country. (Scelzo 2010. 240) 
5.2.4. Continued contacts with LURD 
Eventually after the continued disagreements in the LURD leadership the delegation had to suspend 
its presence in the peace talks. Conneh cut all external contacts since he did not want to be 
pressured. Consequently the LURD delegation was included in the talks again when the official 
mediation team came to the view that they could manage without Conneh. This led to disputes and 
distrust within the fractions of the rebel movement. Pointed by Sant’Egidio gambling with the split 
between Conneh and the LURD delegation was risking the whole peace process. (Scelzo 2010. 241) 
As its approach shows Sant’Egidio maintained communications with Conneh even during the 
difficult times in the peace talks when the media and observers were pessimistic about the outcome. 
Between 4 and 12 July in Maputo there was an African Union Summit and Mario Giro and Luca 
Riccardi on behalf of Sant’Egidio met with the presidents of countries involved in the Liberian 
crisis accompanied with the mediator General Abubakar. The golden exile of Taylor in exchange 
for ceding his presidency and the future of Conneh were discussed. Furthermore it was important to 




government. It was mutually agreed that only if Taylor would leave his position also Conneh could 
be asked to abandon his demands for the leadership of the country. (Scelzo 2010. 241) 
In the rare telephone conversations with Sant’Egidio, Conneh reiterated his rejection of the 
suggested solutions but was aware of his politically weakened position. His attacks on Monrovia 
did not yield results and Sant’Egidio was his only way out of the dead end. Sant’Egidio was 
considering different ways of proceeding the talks and came to the conclusion that Conneh had to 
be included directly in order to get forward with the peace process. To clarify the respective 
positions of the LURD delegation and Conneh Sant’Egidio was asked by the LURD delegation to 
facilitate a meeting between them. During the following weeks there were frequent calls between 
Conneh and Sant’Egidio. The complete neutrality of Sant’Egidio convinced Conneh that he would 
not be pressured with ultimatums from his delegation and that decisions would not be forced upon 
him. (Ibid. 242) Consequently the members of the LURD delegation went to Rome to meet Conneh. 
It did not happen without disagreements among the mediation team and the visit was bemoaned by 
ECOWAS. Nevertheless Mario Giro was able to get consent from Abubakar who was the mediator 
in the official peace talks in Accra as well as Ghanaian foreign minister’s support for the LURD 
delegation’s visit to Rome. (Scelzo 2010. 243) In this example the influence of important personal 
connections of the founding members of Sant’Egidio can be viewed in practice. 
There was a lack of understanding from some of the members in the mediation team about the 
dynamics of negotiation. It could be seen in their attitude of mistrust towards the meeting in Rome. 
First of all it would have not been wise to keep the delegation and leadership apart from each other. 
Secondly detaining the delegation in Accra through threats from the international community that 
they cannot follow through would have been more risky for the outcome of the mediation process. 
(Scelzo 2010. 243) 
In Rome 27 July 20 the LURD delegation was ready to talk and formally requested assistance from 
Sant’Egidio to resolve the crisis within the rebel movement. A solution was necessary to end the 
stalemate in the official negotiations because LURD was afraid of losing its credibility in front of 
the international community and not being able to be part of the future transitional government. The 
LURD delegation came to Rome two days before Conneh and during those days the situation in the 
rebel movement and the state of progress in the official negotiations was analyzed. Conneh joined 
the meeting giving the impression that he was in control of the armed wing and claimed to have 
won the war. (Scelzo 2010. 243) He saw the situation from the military point of view shaped 




Taylor and as if he was still in charge. Nonetheless he disregarded the work of his delegation in the 
official peace talks. (Ibid. 244) 
Personal conversations without the other members of the LURD delegation only with Fabio 
Riccardi, Mario Giro, and Vittorio Scelzo were important for the transformation of the mindset of 
Conneh to realistically see the facts. The way Conneh saw himself as the new hope for Liberia was 
totally the opposite from what the international community saw him as, a bloodthirsty rebel who 
used child soldiers. Even the people who he thought he was fighting for saw him just as one of the 
warlords. He was bitter that because of this he was not viewed as politically trustworthy. 
Nevertheless he began to understand that only beneficial option for him would be a rapid peace 
settlement. He also put his ambitions on hold and changed his prime goal to redeem his reputation 
because at present even within LURD his position did not have good prospects. Consequently he 
opened up the talks with his delegation about the terms of the peace agreement and especially on 
the executive issues of the transitional government. The rift within LURD was healed. (Ibid. 244) 
The rebel parties wanted to apply the model of the Democratic Republic of Congo in the sharing of 
the power between three vice-chairmen from the three warring parties. The proposal though had 
previously fallen through and the only possible option was that the chairman would be selected with 
the agreement of the rebels. Nevertheless the president and vice-president would not be from the 
warring parties. Due to the mediation efforts by Sant’Egidio Conneh was now fully supporting the 
path of negotiation. In addition LURD also suggested that Monrovia would be from now on an arms 
free city. (Scelzo 2010. 245) The Rome declaration was a political solution, in which the key 
mechanisms for the selection of the transitional key offices were laid. (Ibid. 246) 
Taylor fled the country and after previous failed attempts for peace the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement on Liberia was signed 18 August 2003. The transitional government equally represented 
by the three parties and chairman chosen from the civil society steered Liberia towards its first free 
elections. (Ibid. 246) After the peace agreement was signed there was an ethnic drift looming in 
LURD 2004. In May Sant’Egidio arranged discussions in Rome with the three constituent members 
of the government. The parties signed a Pact Communiqué, which reflected the focus on the issues 
faced in the difficult times of post-conflict reconstruction. Thus they agreed to solve potential 
problems through political means. (Ibid. 248) In Monrovia there is a local community of 
Sant’Egidio that was working among the poor (Sant’Egidio 2009) furthermore Liberia still in 2010 
was facing many challenges and there were still wounds to heal that the conflict left to the area. 




5.2.5. Summary of the mediation in Liberia 
Sant’Egidio started as an observer in the official peace talks and later after establishing personal 
relationship with LURD they were requested to facilitate dialogue within LURD as well as they 
were communicating with the official mediators. Disagreements within the rebel group posed 
challenges to the mediation. Sant’Egidio was able to understand the humane reasons why the 
official peace talks were not progressing. Through personal contact with the official mediator Giro 
was able to make them understand that more time was needed to solve the inner crisis within LURD 
and Sant’Egidio was trusted with it by the rebels. Listening the concerns of Conneh in personal 
conversations with the members of Sant’Egidio were crucial to transform the mindset of the rebel 
leader to understand the reality of only way to save his reputation was to join the official peace 
talks. Sant’Egidio also stayed connected during the implementation after the peace agreement was 
signed. 
5.3. Casamance 
There are many parties in the conflict but the mediation efforts by Sant’Egidio are focused on the 
Northern Front of the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) and the state of 
Senegal. The current secessionist movement of Casamance is a reaction to the failure to integrate 
the region into the Senegalese nation. Rudolf (2016) argues that the drivers of the conflict are 
related to perception of marginalization rather than any particular facts about political and economic 
marginalization. (Rudolf 2016) Serna (2016) argues that in Senegal there is historical resistance for 
direct engagement in mediation and thus currently Sant’Egidio is an accepted mediator because it is 
a non-state actor. The conflict has gone through two negotiation phases. First one was in the 
beginning of 21st century and the second one in 2012 when the Community of Sant’Egidio was 
mediating the conflict. According to Fisas (2016. 39) the problem in the recent years has been the 
rapid increase of government initiatives. (Fisas 2016) Moreover Fisas (2015b. 4) notes that the 
period from 2012 to 2014 was an exploratory phase, and until 2015 there had been 5 rounds of 
mediation. 
5.3.1. Background of the peace process 
The first contact with the Community of Sant’Egidio was made 1990, and in 1991 the first ceasefire 
was declared. The split into Northern and Southern front of MFDC happened in 1992. In year 1999 
the launch of the “Banjul process” reached a ceasefire. In 2000 the new President Abdoulaye Wade 
was elected. Wade changed the mediation strategy assigning the responsibilities to a ministerial 




control over various dissident groups. A general peace agreement was signed in the end of year 
2004 and in theory it ended the 22 year old conflict. MFDC gave up claims for independence and 
switched focus to development of the area since the President tried to buy off the rebels with 
development projects (Evans 2015). Nevertheless both factions of MFDC remained active and the 
implementation of the agreement was consequently only partial. In the beginning of 2011 a 
proposal of a peace plan for Casamance was presented by the forum consisting of representatives 
from different political parties and civil society that was called the National Conference. In the end 
of 2011 the Secretary-General of the MFDC announced that their intention was to become a 
political party instead of fighting for independence. (Fisas 2016. 40) 
The peace process of Casamance relates to the theory on peace processes for example by Saunders 
(Burgess 2004) that different arenas simultaneously work towards peace from civil society to the 
official arena and as Allen Nan (Burgess 2004) describes the track 1.5 it represents the cooperation 
that evolved between Sant’Egidio and the President of Senegal throughout the peace process. Also 
the civil society has its part simultaneously to the other tracks. The theory of Sisk (Burgess 2004) 
that the peace process is about reciprocal steps of confidence building can be also related to the 
work of Sant’Egidio. Also the track 7 from the theory of Diamond and McDonald (IMTD 2016) is 
well presented in the peace process through the collaboration of the representatives of the local 
Catholic Church. As Spencer (2016) wrote about the formal and informal actions in a peace process 
also in this case it has been evident that the informal trust building efforts has been necessary on the 
side of the formal peace process. Nevertheless the parallel mediation processes also brought 
challenges. 
5.3.2. 2012 – Mediation request from Senegal to the Community of Sant’Egidio 
It was the President of Senegal Wade who in early 2012 requested mediation from the Community 
of Sant’Egidio that would establish dialogue between the Northern Front of MFDC led by Salif 
Sadio. This faction was considered as the most belligerent one. The leader of the Northern Front 
demanded that the negotiations would take place in a neutral country outside the continent (Fisas 
2013). There were hopes that new leadership of the country would enable to resolution of the 
Casamance conflict, and in March Macky Sall won the presidential elections (Ibid.). In April 2012 
the new President decided to involve Gambia and Guinea-Bissau to the peace process that was 
welcomed by the MFDC. It was one of the priorities of the president to get peace in Casamance 
(Fisas 2013). In June 2012 through the mediation by Sant’Egidio Sadio proposed a negotiated exit 
to the Casamance conflict. Sadio insisted to have the Community of Sant’Egidio as the mediator as 




Front were involved. There were positive signs that the peace talks could be established which was 
then officially announced. In July there were meetings in Guinea-Bissau between the parties. After 
a month and a half the Senegalese Prime Minister Abdoul Mbaye confirmed that the negotiations 
were established with the MFDC and the possibility of its extension to other interested stakeholders 
of the crisis. Mbaye also emphasized that the government would ensure a decentralization process 
in Casamance to improve their living conditions (Fisas 2013). (Fisas 2016) 
According to Fisas (2013) analysts and observers stressed that the government was creating 
conditions to restore peace in Casamance, but also beyond the mediation by Sant’Egidio there were 
efforts underway to include several local and international actors in the process. There were also 
challenges because of the divisions within the MFDC which has a political wing, and a military 
wing divided to different factions. The Southern faction is on the border of Guinea Bissau. The 
Northern faction is on the frontier with Gambia, and the third faction in the eastern area of Kolda. 
Despite the major challenges of each of the factions claiming hegemony over the MFDC two rival 
factions of the MFDC led by Ousmane Niantang Diatta and César Atoute Badiate entered a 
reunification agreement in September. (Fisas 2013) 
In the middle of October the MFDC delegation and the Senegalese government delegation met in 
Rome at the Community of Sant’Egidio for a discussion about a peace agreement. According to 
Sant’Egidio the in-depth talks went well in a serene and constructive atmosphere (Sant’Egidio 
2012a). According to Sant’Egidio they were able to persuade the rebel leader of the MFDC to grant 
liberation to the government soldiers as a humanitarian gesture with fundamental importance to 
promote favorable climate for the negotiations (Sant’Egidio 2012b). In December after the MFDC 
released eight soldiers after a year of captivity the authorities of Senegal announced that the peace 
talks would resume in January 2013 in Rome. In those talks the middle way would be tried to find 
between the autonomy and advanced regionalization of Casamance. (Fisas 2013) In parallel with 
the mediation process by Sant’Egidio there was mediation initiated by the president Sall to unite the 
factions of the MFDC. (Fisas 2016) 
By the end of the year 2012 mediation process was going well although with some interruptions. 
The conflict in Casamance was categorized as violent conflict nevertheless it was not an armed 
conflict. (Fisas 2013) 
5.3.3. 2013 – Discreetly continued negotiations 
The negotiations were continued discreetly however there were reports in the media that the focus 




bothered by it. This also reflects the theory of Garrigues (2015. 6) in reality how the uncoordinated 
efforts were sending mixed messages to the conflicting parties. The Southern faction still had great 
capacity to violence with 80% of their combatants being well armed even though it had recently 
been less violent. Its representatives showed willingness to make peace and to unite the divisions of 
the MFDC. Other peace initiatives were on going. In April 2013 Sadio was not anymore under an 
international arrest warrant which was confirmed by the Community of Sant’Egidio as a 
precondition by the separatist group and ought to contribute as a conciliatory step to the climate of 
trust and the environment of the negotiations taking place in Rome (Sant’Egidio 2013a). One of the 
leaders of the MFDC Niantang Diatta showed support to the request of entering negotiations by Sall 
and to the continuance of the peace process as he requested a third cease fire among the combatants 
and a wish to resolving the conflict with fair and disciplined negotiations. Robert Sagna also met 
with several military leaders of the MFDC although Fisas (2016) notes that his parallel mediation 
efforts were problematic. 
The track 7 from the theory of Diamond and McDonald (IMTD 2016) is well presented in the peace 
process through the collaboration of the representatives of the local Catholic Church. The majority 
of the Senegalese are Muslims nevertheless Catholic clerics possess equally high moral authority 
nonetheless religion and the state are constitutionally separated (BTI 2016. 7). One example of the 
track 7 was in May when Niantang Diatta met in secret with the Cardinal Théodore Adrien Sarr. As 
the theory of Böhmelt (2009) describes they were functioning as indirect connections. Furthermore 
other tracks of local and international stakeholders with several events continued their initiatives 
linked to the peace process between the government of Senegal and the MFDC. (Fisas 2014) 
The second meeting in Rome between the Northern Front of MFDC and the Community of 
Sant’Egidio was held in November and common agenda for further negotiations was drafted 
(Sant’Egidio 2013b). Although the negotiations were on going they were in difficulties by the end 
of 2013. The status of the situation in Casamance was of a former unresolved conflict that was still 
in need of negotiation hence the parties in the conflict were taking part in a consolidated peace 
process. (Fisas 2014) 
5.3.4. 2014 – Facilitation of communication by the Community of Sant’Egidio and creating 
conditions for peace 
Contacts between the government of Senegal and the MFDC continued with the facilitation by the 
Community of Sant’Egidio during the first months of the year. Sant’Egidio confidently confirmed 
in February that the agreement on confidence building measures was signed by the parties’ 




also agreed to behave in a way that was favorable to the peace talks. As part of the commitment 
Sadio declared a unilateral ceasefire. In March the President proclaimed that the negotiations would 
be accompanied by economic measures and a development plan for the region. Additionally he 
announced the idea of the “peace of the brave” that there would not be winners or losers in the 
conflict. After meeting the US special adviser for Casamance the Southern Front’s leader Badiate 
rejected the “peace of the brave” although he showed willingness to continue in the peace talks. 
Badiate suggested that the peace talks would take place in the US but a spokesman for the 
Senegalese government was willing to negotiate making it clear that the talks would not cross the 
line of Senegal’s sovereignty over Casamance. Boulware confirmed his meeting with the members 
of the Southern and Northern factions of the MFDC as well as Senegalese government officials thus 
in his view the right conditions for peace were present. At this point there were concerns for 
example by the Catholic Church bishop of Ziguinchor that too many intermediaries were involved 
in conflict and criticism from MFDC of launching initiatives without consulting them. (Fisas 2015. 
37) As also noted in theory by Garrigues (2015. 6) this shows how there can be too many 
uncoordinated efforts undermining the broader strategy of the peace process. 
The most important development in the peace process took place 29th of April when Sadio declared 
a unilateral ceasefire thus implementing the previous commitments made to enable return to peace 
(Sant’Egidio 2014b) and giving a chance to the peace process promoted by Sall’s government. The 
decision came as a result of discussions in Italy between the MFDC and the Government mediated 
by the Community of Sant’Egidio with the support of the US. UN congratulated Sant’Egidio for 
being able to create the right conditions for achieving a peaceful solution to the conflict in 
Casamance. (Fisas 2015. 38) 
Since 22nd of February when the different parties agreed to adopt mutual trust and confidence 
building measures towards the end of the second quarter of the year the mediators indicated that 
there was significant progress in the negotiations but the process was far from reaching a 
conclusion. Nevertheless there was political will to use this historical opportunity for advantage to 
resolve the protracted conflict. According to press reports also there were initiatives by women to 
have traditional ceremonies that would bring together civilians and MFDC members to contribute to 
peace and forgiveness. (Ibid.) 
In the third quarter of 2014 the search for negotiated solution was still continuing. The facilitator, 
the Community of Sant’Egidio reported through its spokespeople that a meeting had taken place in 




issues and agreed to collaborate to reduce suffering of the people in Casamance (Sant’Egidio 
2014c). The delegations appreciated the atmosphere and frankness of the talks in Rome that were 
conducted according to the procedures and schedule jointly established by the government and rebel 
delegations (Ibid.). This is an example of the transformative mediation theory by Baruch Bush and 
Folger (Spangler 2003) in practice when the parties have the ownership themselves to establish the 
procedures and schedules with only facilitative strategies by the mediator. In the meanwhile the 
Programme Gouvernance et Paix (PGP) by USAID was providing financial and technical support 
for the dialogue for social stability (USAID 2014. 21). 
It was noted by the close sources to the mediation process that there were still important differences 
in existence in certain areas but there was a prominent awareness and willingness by the conflicting 
parties to keep going for solution on this historic moment. The atmosphere on the progress of the 
negotiations was hence optimistic. It was due to the general calm climate in Casamance and 
previously freed government soldiers by the MFDC and the unilateral ceasefire by the Northern 
Front. Additionally there had been significant degree of civil society mobilization for peace. 
Especially from Senegalese women and women’s organizations that were encouraging the 
coordinated efforts of different peace groups, symbolic actions in support of peace as well as 
support for the peace talks facilitated by the Community of Sant’Egidio. In November the President 
Sall went to a meeting in Rome. He visited the Community of Sant’Egidio and met with the 
founder, Andrea Riccardi, the president of Sant’Egidio, Marco Impagliazzo, the vice president 
Kpakilé Felemou, Angelo Romano, and Mauro Garofalo, the head of International Relations 
department of Sant’Egidio. (Fisas 2015) There was growing cooperation with Sant’Egidio and 
Senegal to promote peace and stability in the region and dialogue between cultures and religions 
(Sant’Egidio 2014d). 
By the end of the year 2014 the peace process seemed to be going well, and the former unresolved 
armed conflict, still in need of negotiations as its status, was in a consolidated peace process. 
Despite of the significant events during this year there were no significant changes because of the 
divisions inside the MFDC, large number of internal intermediaries, as well as the request by 
Badiate to hold the talks abroad in the US. (Fisas 2015. 13, 16, 39) 
5.3.5. 2015 – Lack of real roadmap 
In 2015 the peace process was lacking a clear roadmap where to continue. The MFDC addressed 
the President Sall to proclaim for peace in Casamance. They also wanted the state chosen 




needed to appoint the US ambassador in Senegal to be part of the peace process. Boulware was still 
asked to encourage and help the conflicting parties in their pursuit for peace but as the US embassy 
clarified he turned down the offer and would not participate as a mediator in the peace process 
under any circumstances. (Fisas 2015. 42) End of 2015 Serna (2015) describes the situation in 
Casamance, which is neither war nor peace, which is closely related to the theory by MacGinty 
(2010). Additionally uncoordinated development aid from international actors and problems with 
implementation on the ground causes challenges in the region weakening the credibility of the state. 
(BTI. 2016. 32) 
The negotiations at the end of year 2015 between the government of Senegal and the MFDC were 
in difficulties, and the formerly unresolved armed conflict still required negotiation thus Senegal 
and MFDC remained in consolidated peace process. It means that the parties have agreed on the 
methodology, timing, and format of the negotiations as well as possible mediation. (Fisas 2016. 13, 
21) Furthermore in 2016 Serna describes the situation on the ground in Casamance as forgotten 
conflict and the war economy is undermining the urgency to end the conflict. Serna (2016) argues 
that the peace process does not really exist but the people try to force peace locally. He argues that 
this is due to the engagement of a non-state mediator through the state (Ibid.). Additionally Serna 
argues that Sant’Egidio has not been able to get tangible nor transparent outcomes in the mediation 
process (Ibid.). Nevertheless because of the confidentiality in the mediation approach of 
Sant’Egidio is a priority (Bartoli 2012. 111) the view to the people on the ground might seem that 
nothing is happening. 
5.3.6. Summary of the mediation in Casamance 
Sant’Egidio has been historically involved in the peace process. Sant’Egidio was the main mediator 
between the state and the Northern Front of MFDC. Since Sant’Egidio was engaged to the 
mediation through the state of Senegal the rebels were condemning it. Neverthless they stated that 
they viewed Sant’Egidio as an honest broker. This could be due to the notion that clerics are viewed 
in Senegal as having high moral authority but also because Sant’Egidio represents a neutral outsider 
mediator. Sant’Egidio was able to make progress in the mediation process. As part of the mediation 
approach of Sant’Egidio confidentiality might pose a challenge for the transparency of the 
mediation process, which could be consequently seemingly non-existent on the ground because 
conducted discreetly. Challenges were also met in the lack of cooperation between plenty different 
mediation efforts. Evidence from financial and technical support could be found in this case that 




5.4. Particular resources and main challenges in the approach of faith-based 
mediation by the Community of Sant’Egidio 
The Community of Sant’Egidio has certain amount of mediator leverage since it has been able to be 
a relevant actor in international mediation as it is shown in the cases studied in this master thesis. 
The main points from the three empirical cases and the particular resources and challenges of the 
Community of Sant’Egidio following from their approach to mediation are discussed and analyzed 
in connection with the theoretical framework of leverage in faith-based mediation. 
The approach of faith-based mediation by the Community of Sant’Egidio emphasizes 
personalization, confidentiality, absence of pressure, and ownership of the conflicting parties (Giro 
2012. 97) thus it is also demonstrated in the chosen cases. These characteristics can be connected to 
the particular resources as well as challenges when they conduct mediation. The particular resources 
that Sant’Egidio can draw on when conducting mediation are linked to credibility, capability, and 
faith-based leverage. 
5.4.1. Balancing between credibility leverage and capability leverage 
In the theory on peace processes Spencer (2016) argues how powerful the role of emotions is in a 
peace process. Similarly Giro (2012. 101) notes that the emotions of the different sides to the 
conflict are focused in the mediation approach by Sant’Egidio because it leads to the roots of the 
disagreements. Acknowledging emotions of the conflicting parties is also shown in the empirical 
case studies as well as the role of Sant’Egidio as the humane mediator to counteract on the 
phenomenon in international mediation focusing on technicalities. 
Garrigues (2015) and Lanz. et al. (2009) state that NGOs can be effective in the early stages of 
engaging with armed groups as well as in the moments when the parties are opposing the official 
mediation. Similarly this is also demonstrated by the empirical case studies of the thesis. In the case 
of Mozambique, on the ground presence gave Sant’Egidio a view to the real issues that were 
internally caused and this information gave them credibility leverage to transform the relationship 
between the conflicting parties reflecting on their psychological aspects (Giro 2012. 94-95). 
Nevertheless it is challenging for a mediator to demonstrate in practice the transformation from 
combatant mindset into political mindset (Giro 2012. 95). In the case of Liberia this was able to be 
done through personal conversations with the rebel leader, which shows how Sant’Egidio was able 




The focus of the mediation approach by the Community of Sant’Egidio is on creating direct 
connections with the conflicting parties to have a personal relationship with them. Nevertheless as 
the theory of Böhmelt (2009) suggests indirect ties are evolved into direct ties between Sant’Egidio 
and the parties in conflict. An empirical example of this is ending up as mediators facilitating 
dialogue between the parties after being observers in official peace talks that concentrate on the 
technicalities filling the void of highlighting the humane aspects. Proceeding to direct ties between 
the parties Sant’Egidio was able to shape the nature of bargaining. 
One particular resource for the mediation approach by Sant’Egidio has been continuity of the 
personal relationships. In Mozambique the engagement of Sant’Egidio in the beginning, during, and 
after is also mentioned by the Global Ethic Foundation (2009) to increase its credibility in the eyes 
of the parties that can be connected to the theory on religious non-profit organizations in peace 
processes by Grad (2014). The effectiveness was due to their network of religious and political 
contacts not only in Mozambique but also with other countries (Global Ethic Foundation 2009). 
Thus the future of continued mediation efforts by Sant’Egidio can be at risk because the symbolic 
and social capital is connected to the founding members thus when they will retire and new people 
will continue their work it might be that they go back to their original work and not pursue the 
international mediation role anymore (Anouilh 2011. 112). 
Since working in synergy and multi-party mediation is a vital point in the mediation approach by 
Sant’Egidio, on one hand uncoordinated efforts can pose a challenge for the smooth progress of 
their mediation, which was especially shown in the case of Casamance. On the other hand in 
Mozambique the cooperation was efficient, furthermore in Liberia Sant’Egidio was able to progress 
the mediation in synergy with the official talks thanks to its efficient communication between the 
mediators as well as the rebel leader. 
From the point of view of the theories on mediator leverage it would be said that NGOs do not have 
capability leverage but the empirical cases on the mediation approach of Sant’Egidio show that they 
have also means to get particular resources related to capability leverage from other actors in the 
field and donations in general because of their inherent sources of credibility leverage. For example 
in the case of Mozambique Bartoli (2012. 120) argues that they were involved because of their 
connectivity capabilities and consequently capacity to deliver what they were assigned for. 
It is inevitable that the Community of Sant’Egidio gets capability leverage from the donations and 
quests for their mediation efforts although this could not be detected from the data on Liberia 




for the US government. In the case of Casamance there was found one source of financial and 
technical support, furthermore Anouilh (2011. 111) expressed the financial matter pointing to the 
annual budget of Sant’Egidio. The Community of Sant’Egidio uses the capability leverage to 
maintain presence and funding for the mediation on their own part when for example inviting 
conflicting parties to their headquarters for parallel mediation alongside the official talks and also 
when they are part of an international mediation team. Furthermore they do not use their capability 
leverage to practice directive strategies to pressure the parties contrariwise they allow them time to 
reflect during the mediation process in order to transform from combatants to politicians. 
Riccardi (2010. 10) notes that they have had close relations with diplomats Sant’Egidio can reach 
out for expertise and capacity to intervene from network of contacts. The connections were not 
public in the 1990s but are nowadays admitted. Consequently because of their unique moral and 
spiritual leverage coming from faith-based characteristics they are also able to get capability 
leverage through their influential connections. Additionally Bartoli notes that the intelligence 
gathering of the Community is parallel to state actors and Sant’Egidio can be well informed on the 
ground through its already established local networks (2012. 111) such as demonstrated in the 
historical relations with Mozambique and with the peace process in Casamance. 
5.4.2. Faith-based leverage 
The faith-based foundation of Sant’Egidio add an extra layer to the particular resources available to 
them and challenges following from the religious aspects. For example a peculiar paradox regarding 
the Community in mediating conflicts is that they attracted economic capital which is symbolically 
expensive thus it is something they should hide to keep their image (Anouilh 2011. 111). 
Additionally according to Magister (1998) the inner hierarchy of Sant’Egidio based in Catholic 
tradition could be in discordance with its pronounced image of supporting democratic development 
in their work for peace, since Andrea Riccardi basically has been always in charge of the 
Community. 
Anouilh argues that in the sphere of religion it is particular to have interest in disinterest (Anouilh 
2011. 106). From this point he explains how the work of Sant’Egidio attracts material goods, in 
other words their credibility and faith-based leverage attracts capability leverage. In the words of 
Anouilh (2010. 210) the founders of Sant’Egidio possess a special combination of social legitimacy 
and religious dedication and when they get material goods at the same time the donor gets 
remunerated in a symbolic way with symbolic legitimacy for their brand. This can be seen also in 




Sant’Egidio gives them symbolic legitimacy and in turn they can give funding for the Catholic 
Community. 
As Giro (2012) notes Sant’Egidio rather focuses on the humane aspects than directly religious 
aspects when conducting mediation. Nonetheless because of the religious identity of Sant’Egidio 
and its founding members who are involved in the mediation efforts can give them faith-based 
leverage in the view of the conflicting parties when they request their mediation. Through their 
religious identity that is connected to the high moral authority they are trusted to be suitable as 
mediators that will conform to recognized moral principles. Nevertheless the conflicting parties as 
shown in the empirical case studies primarily viewed Sant’Egidio as an outsider to the conflict 
without financial or political agenda thus a neutral mediator. As the cases show the mediation was 
requested by the parties because of the perceived neutrality. 
In Mozambique through distributing humanitarian aid Sant’Egidio was able to teach the people 
about peace and thus people in Mozambique view that Sant’Egidio was the main driver in the peace 
process since they were creating a feeling of communion and being part of a big family. (Anouilh 
2011. 95-96) In this case the religious background evidently gave them more legitimacy among the 
common people similarly to the theory of Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana (2009. 195) that faith-
based actors can make a significant contribution to the official mediation, in this case as part of the 
mediation team. Sant’Egidio had the role of using facilitative and formulative strategies of 
mediation complementary to the official mediation. However Branco (2011) argues that mediation 
by the Community of Sant’Egidio was just supporting the directive mediation by states and that 
Sant’Egidio was never a true mediator in a sense that influential states have more decisive part in 
getting over impasses in the mediation process. Even though the faith-based mediator would not 
have the traditional kind of leverage there can be seen a clear influence to the peace process with 
their “own form of leverage” (Reid 2015. 4). Thus the theory of Reid is indicated in all the 
empirical cases studied here and as opposite to what Branco argues Sant’Egidio had its own 
moments of getting over impasses in the mediation process without dismissing the influential part, 
which the mediators using capability leverage have. Furthermore this implies the opposite goals of 
problem-solving and transformative mediation and the different strategies of reaching the goals. 
Faith-based leverage is not so easy to detect from the cases because confidentiality is a fundamental 
part of the mediation approach of the Community of Sant’Egidio, and there is not much information 
published on the mediation style in the more recent mediation processes. Nevertheless in 




genuine relationships with the parties in an informal yet confidential atmosphere and the fact that 
not much is published about the mediation itself might view their mediation ineffective. Thus it is a 
challenge for Sant’Egidio to pronounce that they can be as effective in doing their part in the 
mediation as states for example. Nevertheless the people inside the field of mediation are more 
informed about the leverage of Sant’Egidio as noted by Giro (2012. 99) and this can be also seen in 
their continued involvement in international mediation. 
Political neutrality and independent nature gave credibility (Global Ethic Foundation 2009) to 
Sant’Egidio in Mozambique. Sant’Egidio was originally withdrawing from taking part in politics 
nevertheless in the recent years they have had connections to politics in Rome and Vatican (s.n. 
2011) (Magister 2013) that could be a disadvantage for their reputation as a religious community 
and faith-based mediator as Appleby (1998. 42) notes that remaining religious allows faith-based 
actors to have positive and critical role in the world. Similarly shown in the empirical cases the 
strength of Sant’Egidio to be a relevant actor in international mediation has been its specific 
transformative faith-based approach to mediation creating counter balance for directive and 
manipulative mediation. On one hand when getting more secular it does not mean that they would 
automatically change their approach to mediation. But on the other hand the connections with 
powerful states can make them seem more biased that was also shown in the case of Casamance 
where the parties wanted to have the mediation in the US when Sant’Egidio was engaged to the 
mediation through the state of Senegal. 
In Mozambique Sant’Egidio had credibility from not having political or economic agenda and was 
viewed neutral by the parties but it could have been viewed as biased towards FRELIMO since they 
had cultural and historical ties with the government officials through the humanitarian aid and since 
only later the ties to the rebel party were established. Nevertheless it differs from the view point if 
this is seen as a particular resource for mediation or a challenge following from the previous ties. 
Furthermore if the influence of faith-based leverage is considered it is logical that Sant’Egidio 
would have been viewed as neutral because of its unique moral and spiritual leverage from the 
reputation to follow respected values and use their leverage for good therefore being an honest 
broker. 
From the approach of faith-based mediation by the Community of Sant’Egidio in the three cases 
can be seen their interest in disinterest when conducting mediation since the conflicting parties 
viewed Sant’Egidio as trusted and honest. They opened up about their feelings and emotions in an 




because Sant’Egidio was able to be respected through their ethical force, which can be considered 
as faith-based leverage. The particular resources for this faith-based leverage come from the 
realistic view to mediation to accept failure giving the ownership of the outcome of the mediation 
process to the parties. The mediators of Sant’Egidio are not paid and are not after personal gain 
because of the interest in disinterest that comes from their religious moral, which cannot be 






In this master thesis I have asked through the research questions: How do the religious aspects of 
the Catholic Lay NGO Sant’Egidio shape their approach to mediation? What particular resources 
can they draw on when they conduct mediation, and what are the main challenges following from 
their approach? 
The religious aspects of Communio, Traditio, Romanitas, and Pietas are the base for the life of the 
Community of Sant’Egidio as well as fundamental element shaping their approach to mediation and 
motivation to mediate. The founding members are the ones who have special symbolic legitimacy 
from social legitimacy and religious dedication. The combination of religious and secular elements 
contributes to their faith-based mediation, which focus is on humane aspects instead of technical 
aspects of mediation.  
I found out through the analysis of the three empirical case studies that when the founding members 
of the Community of Sant’Egidio conduct mediation they can draw on particular resources 
connected to credibility leverage, faith-based leverage, and capability leverage. 
They get credibility leverage through historical and cultural connections with the Catholic Church 
as well as through their Communities that have spread worldwide. They also consciously nurture 
personal relationships with political elite as well as civil society. Their intelligence gathering is 
parallel to state actors and through their Communities in conflict torn countries they get information 
that can enable them to be relevant actors in peace processes. 
Faith-based leverage of Sant’Egidio comes from particular resources connected to their identity as 
religious actors and their resources, strategies, and motivations. Their faith-based leverage come for 
example from their reputation for high moral authority as well as Sant’Egidio is known to be an 
honest broker and only mediates for the moral value of peace without personal agenda thus they are 
respected through ethical force and they do not need material directive strategies of mediation. 
Additionally because peace is their passion not profession they afford to give time to reflect for the 
parties without pressure or ready-made peace agreements. On the contrary they focus on 
transforming the psychological aspects of the conflicting parties and listen what they have on their 
heart. In this way they can also contribute to reconciliation already during the mediation and begin 
healing. 
Through credibility and faith-based leverage Sant’Egidio is also able to get capability leverage 




maintain presence and funding of mediation processes. It can be challenging for their image if they 
get a lot of economic welfare because it is not in line with their disinterest in economic 
compensations for their mediation efforts. 
Since the particular resources for their mediation come mainly from personal relationships and 
historical and cultural connections with different actors, they mainly work parallel to official 
diplomacy or part of mediation teams in synergy with other actors. Nevertheless sometimes the 
uncoordinated efforts might risk the peace process. Furthermore their connections with powerful 
states might pose challenges for their reputation as neutral mediators. One challenge is also posed 
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